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Alleviating Negative Spillover of a Brand-Harm Crisis: Sensegiving vs. 
Sensehiding in a Competitor’s Denial Response Strategy 
 
ABSTRACT 
A brand-harm crisis not only affects the scandalized brand, but may also influence 
competing brands. Thus, marketers of competing brands need to develop response 
strategies for reducing negative spillover effects. This research takes a competitor’s 
perspective and introduces two types of response strategies used to convey a sense of 
denial: sensegiving and sensehiding. It also investigates how the effects of response 
strategies are contingent upon brand relatedness and individual thinking styles. The results 
from three experimental studies show that using a sensegiving strategy reduces negative 
spillover effects more than using a sensehiding strategy. Additionally, the studies suggest 
that the observed difference in the effects of response strategy tends to be greater when the 
level of brand relatedness is high than when it is low. However, individual thinking styles 
(holistic vs. analytic) seem to have little impact on consumers’ responses to the two denial 
strategies. This research contributes to the brand-harm crisis literature and provides novel 
insights into a competitor’s response to potential negative spillover effects.  
 
Keywords: sensegiving, sensehiding, brand-harm crisis, spillover effects, brand relatedness, 
thinking style 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Problem Identification 
Brand-harm crises are widely prevalent, ranging from Toyota’s worldwide recall to the 
exposure of sweat shop labour by Nike’s suppliers. These crises cause serious damages, which 
arouse the academic interest in the consequences of brand crises (Ahluwalia, 2002; Dutta & 
Pullig, 2011). While it is important to study the negative effect of brand-harm crisis on the 
scandalized brand or company, it is equally important to realize that related brands, companies or 
even the whole product category, which are not referred to in the brand-harm crisis, may also 
suffer severely. For example, on 19th Nov. 2012, the liquor products of JiuGui, a well-known 
Chinese brand in the Baijiu category, were exposed to be over the limit of dibutyl phthalate 
(DBP), a component that can cause cancer. It was not surprising that the stock price of JiuGui 
Liquor Co., Ltd broke the bottom line. However, the market value of all the liquor stocks 
vaporized 32.4 billion on the same day. The term “spillover” is used to illustrate this situation. It 
refers to the phenomenon of informational influences beliefs or behaviors that are not directly 
mentioned in a communication (Ahluwalia, Unnava, & Burnkrant, 2001).  
Prior studies show that one brand’s crisis can spill over from the scandalized brand to 
another brand, such as a brand in the same brand alliance (Votola & Unnava, 2006) or portfolio 
(Lei, Dawar, & Lemmink, 2008). Moreover, it is possible that the rival brands or the whole 
product category of the scandalized brand are also affected (Dahlen & Lange, 2006; Roehm & 
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Tybout, 2006). To deal with such situation, competitors can release a response after the 
brand-harm crisis, just as a scandalized company might do. Researchers have highlighted the 
importance of competitors’ denial response strategy to the negative spillover effect from a 
brand-harm crisis (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). They suggested that when a negative spillover takes 
place, a denial response by a competitor is better than a silence response because a denial can 
lead to more favorable attitudes toward and beliefs about that competing brand, reducing the 
negative spillover effect. However, the real business world is more complicated. Consumers may 
not process the denial message literally (Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). The correction 
brought by the denial response may cause unwanted results (Darke, Ashworth, & Ritchie, 2008). 
In addition, using an overly accommodating strategy may worsen the situation as well (Coombs, 
2007b). Facing such a dilemma in presenting a denial response, marketers have to consider other 
ways to disperse consumers’ doubts about the competitors’ involvement in a brand-harm crisis in 
other ways, rather than just saying, “We have no such problems”.  
However, prior research did not provide marketers with sufficient clues about how to 
respond to negative spillover from other brands in the same product category. In their research, 
Roehm and Tybout (2006) used the word “subtle” to describe one of the two denial messages 
that were delivered by competitors in the two experimental studies, without providing any further 
interpretation relating to the usage of such subtle language. This word “subtle” implies the 
existence of different forms of denial response, which may have different outcomes on reducing 
the negative spillover effect. Due to the importance of a competitor’s response strategy to the 
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negative spillover effect and the lack of related studies, more research is needed to answer a 
series of questions. Which form of denial response can persuade consumers to believe the 
innocence of the competing brand? Do different forms of denial responses have different impacts 
on reducing the negative spillover effect? If these differences do exist, which condition 
influences the effectiveness of different forms of denial response?  
1.2 Research Questions 
To answer these questions, we introduced the concepts of sensegiving and sensehiding to 
the competitor’s denial response strategy in order to test the different effects of two forms of 
denial response strategy on reducing the negative spillover, and to identify the key variables that 
influence their effects. 
The first question relates to sensegiving and sensehiding. We proposed to introduce the 
concepts of sensegiving and sensehiding, which represent different message framings of denial 
response strategy adopted by competitors, to the brand-harm crisis study. We also attempted to 
test whether these two forms of denial response have different impacts on reducing the negative 
spillover effect. From the theoretical perspectives of organizational studies and linguistics (Mayo 
et al., 2004; Vaara & Monin, 2010), sensegiving refers to a technique that mobilizes the discourse 
in terms of promoting a specific kind of thinking and action. In this study, a sensegiving denial 
strategy occurs when a message contains a straightforward denial response. In contrast, 
sensehiding refers to a technique that manipulates discourse in terms of hiding particular ideas 
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(Sinha, Inkson, & Barker, 2012; Vaara & Monin, 2010). A sensehiding denial strategy is defined 
as a message that conveys a denial intention but contains no specific negation words in the 
framing. Based on these two different message framings of denial response, we predicted that 
sensegiving and sensehiding reduce the negative spillover effect in varying degrees. More 
specifically, the negation that the sensegiving denial strategy contains ensures the effectiveness 
of sensegiving message is more than the one of the sensehiding message. 
The second research question concerns the conditions of the two forms of denial strategies. 
We theorized that the effectiveness of a competitor’s denial response strategy (sensegiving vs. 
sensehiding) on alleviating the transfer of negative brand publicity depends on brand relatedness, 
which is defined as the strength of the association between the scandalized brand and the 
competitor brand in this context (Lei, Dawar, and Lemmink, 2008). In particular, we expected 
that sensegiving tends to be more effective than sensehiding when the association between the 
scandalized brand and the competitor brand is strong. In contrast, the effects of the sensegiving 
message and the sensehiding message are likely to be similar when the association is weak. In 
other words, brand relatedness magnifies the difference between the effects given by the two 
forms of denial strategy. Furthermore, we explored whether thinking style, as the individual 
characteristic, affects how consumers process the competitor’s response message of the 
brand-harm crisis. Prior research has provided evidence that individual differences, such as 
different thinking styles, help mitigate the effect of brand-harm crisis differently (Monga & John, 
2008). In this study, we posited that the individual thinking styles also affects how consumers 
  
 
5 
process the competitor’s response message about the brand-harm crisis. Thinking style can be 
divided into two types: analytic and holistic. Analytic thinkers are people who “focus on 
attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and prefer to use rules about the categories to 
explain and predict the object's behavior” (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001, p. 293). 
Holistic thinking refers to “involving an orientation to the context or field as a whole, including 
attention to relationships between a focal object and the field, and a preference for explaining 
and predicting events on the basis of such relationships” (Nisbett et al., 2001, p.293). On the 
basis of these theoretical perspectives, we predicted that when brand relatedness is low, the 
negative spillover effect to competing brand is less salient for analytic thinkers than for holistic 
thinkers. Conversely, when brand relatedness is high, the negative spillover is less salient for 
holistic thinkers than for analytic thinkers.  
1.3 Contributions 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The first theoretical contribution of this study is to introduce the concept of sensemaking to 
the brand-harm crisis area. More specifically, we divided the denial message that is provided by 
a competing brand or company into two forms: sensegiving and sensehiding. These two forms 
have their own message framings, but share the same sense: denial. With these concepts, the 
research related a competitor’s response strategy would be further enhanced. Furthermore, we 
also explored the interaction effect among two response strategies and two contingent variables, 
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brand relatedness and thinking style. The findings of this study help to further understanding the 
meaning of the concepts of sensemaking. 
The second theoretical contribution of this research lies in its focus on a competitor’s 
reactions to brand-harm crisis. A comprehensive review of the current literature indicates that 
few studies have actually addressed brand-harm crisis from a competitor’s perspective. To the 
best of our knowledge, Roehm and Tybout (2006) is perhaps the only study that highlights the 
importance of understanding potential negative spillover to competing brands. Their results 
suggest that a denial strategy could be effective to help competitors to mitigate negative 
consequences. Our research extends the current literature by investigating specific denial 
response strategies.   
The final theoretical contribution of this research is to understand the contingent conditions 
that are associated with denial response strategies. Drawing up the associative network theory 
(Collins and Loftus, 1975), we identity the variable of brand relatedness, and propose that it 
plays a moderating role in affecting consumers’ responses to denial strategies. We explored how 
brand relatedness interacts with a denial message in reducing the negative spillover effect. Thus, 
we provide a better understanding of the contingent conditions.  
1.3.2 Managerial Contributions 
This research provides marketers with a new response strategy when they would consider 
developing a response to other brands’ crises. Instead of simply saying “we are not guilty”, 
competing companies may use a more subtle framing of response messages to convey consumer 
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compliance. Such response may help reduce the negative spillover effect without causing 
counterarguments among the target consumers.   
The second managerial contribution is to provide additional clues about how to use the 
denial message strategically. Previous research emphasizes the similarity between the 
scandalized brand and the competing brand (Dahlen & Lange, 2006). In this research, we 
emphasized that brand relatedness is more relevant the understanding of negative spillover 
effects. It can help marketers to identify the connection between the scandalized brand and 
competing brand, making the denial message more effective in the marketplace. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
Given the theoretical nature of the research, an experimental method was adopted. More 
specially, experiments are used to grasp the cause-and-effect relationship between variables 
(Hicks & Turner, 1999). Researchers can control or manipulate some certain variables or 
conditions in order to exclude interferences. Hence, the effects of variables other than the 
independent variables are minimized. The design of the experiment has two principles: control 
and randomization (Fisher, 1935). The first principle refers to the identification of potential 
confounding factors and conduction of additional mechanisms to control the factors. The point of 
randomization is about control as well. Random assignment can help the researcher to control 
those confounding factors that are not identified. By having effective control of the confounding 
factors and a suitable manipulation, researchers can have a better understanding about whether 
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variable A has the effect on variable B and the valence of the effect. The experimental method is 
relatively common in the consumer behavior study, especially for those studies that use 
psychological theories as the theoretical support.  
We designed the experiments based on prior studies, and the research objectives. We 
conducted three pretests to get the proper experiment materials. Those pretests helped to get the 
acceptable validity. There were three main studies. A one-way test, a two-way interaction and a 
three-way interaction among different forms of denial strategy, brand relatedness and thinking 
style were explored in three studies. Study 1 focused on only the two response strategies, 
sensegiving and sensehiding. The silence strategy was adopted as the baseline in Study 2 and 
Study 3. Furthermore, we manipulated brand relatedness in different ways. To get a high 
generality, a different type of brand-harm crisis was considered as the primary information to 
stimulate the spillover in Study 3 and brand-harm crises in three experiments come from 
different product categories. In all three studies, demographic data, such as gender, age, the 
educational level, was also be collected. Related control variables were included in the studies as 
well. 
The participants included undergraduate students and Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) students. All participants were Chinese students. Approximately five hundred 
respondents participated in all of the three separate studies. The use of a relatively homogenous 
sample was to provide a stronger test of our theoretical arguments and research hypotheses.   
SPSS 19.0 was used as the statistics software to analyze the data. ANOVA was the main 
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statistic method in this research. The experimental data was analyzed with respect to both main 
and interaction effects of the key variables of our interest.   
In conclusion, both the data collection methods and data analyzing methods were designed 
attentively. The experimental design was carefully conducted in line with previous research in 
the area.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Brand-Harm Crisis  
Consumers have access to various kinds of negative information about different brands 
easily. Following the increasing number of brand crises, research related to this topic has also 
been flourishing. Previous research has focused on brand-harm crises from different aspects: (1) 
nature of the brand-harm crisis (Dutta & Pullig, 2011), (2) the consumers’ perspective, such as 
how consumers’ individual traits (e.g., thinking styles, gender or age) affect the processing of the 
brand-harm crisis (Laufer & Gillespie, 2004; Laufer, Silvera, & Meyer, 2005; Monga & John, 
2008), and how consumers respond to brand-harm crises (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, & Unnava, 
2000), (3) the company perspective, such as how company characteristics reduce or increase the 
harm brought by the brand-harm crisis (Greyser, 2009), how a company should respond to the 
brand-harm crisis (Commbs & Holladay, 2008), (4) the external institution perspective, such as 
how government or media’s actions influence the processing for the crisis (Dean, 2004) or, of 
course, (5) the consequences that resulted from by brand-harm crisis.  
Research has already provided sufficient evidence about the effects of a brand-harm crisis 
on the scandalized brand or company. Once a brand suffers a crisis, its sales performance 
(Goldenberg, Libai, Moldovan, & Muller, 2007), financial value (Chen, Ganesan, & Liu, 2009), 
market share (Van Heerde, Helsen, & Dekimpe, 2007) or brand equity may decrease (Dawar & 
Pillutla, 2000). The scandalized company’s reputation is also threatened by the crisis (Coombs, 
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2007a). Consumers’ brand attitude, brand evaluation (Ahluwalia et al., 2000), satisfaction and 
purchase intentions are reduced (Pullig, Netemeyer, & Biswas, 2006) as well. Unfortunately, a 
brand-harm crisis does not only affect a scandalized brand or company.  
A brand is not alone in the complex marketplace. One brand may have a sub-brand, parent 
brand, extended brand, co-brand and competing brand. Hence, it is likely the brand-harm crisis 
can also influence such other brands, which are not mentioned in the brand-harm crisis messages, 
but may be somehow related to scandalized brand. Scholars use a term “spillover” to describe 
such a phenomenon.  
2.2 Negative Spillover of Brand-Harm Crisis 
A spillover occurs when existing information or perceptions influence the beliefs (or 
attitudes) that are not directly indicated by or related to the original information source or 
perception object (Ahluwalia et al., 2001). This phenomenon has been the core concept of some 
significant research streams, such as brand extension or brand alliances research, in the branding 
literature (Janakiraman, Sismeiro, & Dutta, 2009). Researchers have conducted a large amount of 
studies about the spillovers that result from positive information. For instance, the reciprocal 
spillover between the extension brand and the parent brand (Balachander & Ghose, 2003a) the 
positive spillover effects on the individual brands that form the alliance (Simonin & Ruth, 1998), 
the positive effect from the partner brand on the host brand (Desai & Keller, 2002; Swaminathan, 
Reddy, & Dommer, 2012). However, like positive information, negative messages can also 
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induce spillover among brands. The term negative spillover refers to the spillover of negative 
information from one brand to another. This research extends prior work by examining the 
mechanism of a negative spillover and the response strategy against a negative spillover.  
Previous investigations demonstrate that a negative spillover can occur from one 
scandalized brand to another brand within the same brand portfolio (Lei et al., 2008) or brand 
alliances (Votola & Unnava, 2006), from a scandalized brand to its extension brands 
(Balachander & Ghose, 2003a, 2003b; John, Loken, & Joiner, 1998) or from one single 
scandalized brand to the whole product category (Dahlen & Lange, 2006; Roehm & Tybout, 
2006).  
To understand when and how negative spillover occurs, researchers have studied the 
mechanisms behind scandal spillover effects by using frameworks or theories, such as the 
accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Feldman & Lynch, 1988), 
assimilation and contrast effects (Dahlen & Lange, 2006; Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993), 
negativity effects (Votola & Unnava, 2006; Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994) and by the associative 
network theory ( Lei et al., 2008; Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
2.2.1 The Accessibility-Diagnosticity Framework 
The accessibility-diagnosticity framework is used to study the negative spillover effect. This 
framework can be explained by spreading-activation theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975) and 
implicit theory (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994). The framework indicates that “an earlier response 
will be used as a basis for another subsequent response if the former is accessible and if it is 
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perceived to be more diagnostic than other accessible inputs” (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). As for 
phenomena related with multiple brands: the memory of Brand A, which resides in a network 
(accessibility, coming from spreading activation theory), can activate the memory of Brand B 
based on a strong link between the two, making Brand A be considered as informative about 
Brand B (diagnosticity, coming from implicit theory). Thus, the observation of Brand A can be 
implicated to Brand B as well.  
Applying this framework to a brand scandal context, researchers have explored four factors 
that affect the accessibility or diagnosticity of the scandalized brand. The first factor, which 
affects both accessibility and diagnosticity, is the typicality of the scandalized company and 
scandalized attribute. The term “typicality” indicates the good representation of the category and 
relatively highly graded product category membership (Loken & Ward, 1990). For example, 
Burger King is a typical brand, and hamburger is the typical attribute in the fast food category. 
The typical brand or attribute has strong associative linkages with the category, and accessibility 
is elevated by strong associative linkages (Barsalou, 1992). When the scandalized brand (or 
attribute) is typical in the category, consumers may activate the association of the whole product 
category after hearing about the brand-harm crisis. Meanwhile, since a typical brand stands for 
high representativeness of the category, any new information of the brand or company might be 
intuitively viewed as diagnostic (Barsalou, 1985) to the category. In this case, the accessibility 
and diagnosticity of the scandalized brand increase, and the crisis may spill over to other brands. 
The second factor is the valence of the information, which mainly affects the diagnosticity. 
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According to a negativity effect, consumers more weight than on negative information 
(Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990). The brand-harm crisis, as a kind of negative information, 
thus, is much more diagnostic to consumers when they evaluate both a scandalized brand and a 
competing brand. The third factor is similarity among brands and similarity strengthens the 
linkage between brands. On the one hand, high similarity implies that both the scandalized brand 
and the competing brand are in the same brand network, referred as high accessibility. On the 
other hand, Broniarczyk and Alba (1994) pointed out the perceived diagnosticity is positively 
related with similarities. Therefore, a spillover can easily occur from a scandalized brand to a 
competitor, which is similar to the scandalized brand. The fourth factor is context. This factor 
can influence consumers’ perceptions about the diagnosticity of a crisis. More specifically, when 
a contextual cue implies the similarity between brands, consumers may process the brand-harm 
crisis as a common event shared by both the scandalized brand and the competing brand, hence 
the brand-harm crisis has high diagnositicity for the competing brand. In contrast, when a 
contextual cue encourages consumers to think about the distinction among brands, consumers are 
more likely to consider a brand-harm crisis as a unique issue of the scandalized brand. In this 
case, the brand-harm crisis seems to have no effect on the competing brand. Spillover does not 
happen.  
In short, the accessibility-diagnosticity framework can be used to interpret when and how 
the spillover of a brand-harm crisis occurs. The four factors, typicality, valence of the 
brand-harm crisis information, similarity, and context, affect the influences of this framework on 
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when and how a brand-harm crisis spills over to a competing brand. However, the 
accessibility-diagnosticity framework is not the only framework (or effect) to explore the 
mechanism behind the negative spillover.  
2.2.2 Assimilation and Contrast Effects  
Dahlen and Lange (2006)’s study is based on the literature about brand evaluation. As a part 
of brand schema, brand evaluation is a temporary construction. Any attitude-relevant information 
may influence a brand evaluation (Reed II, Wooten, & Bolton, 2002). During the process of 
updating the brand evaluation, context is as important as the brand itself (Weilbacher, 2003). 
When a brand-harm crisis occurs, this negative information may lead to a negative brand 
evaluation of the scandalized brand. Moreover, it is likely that the brand evaluation of its 
competing brand may be interpreted as well, mainly because the brands are in the same product 
category. The result of this interpretation can be either positive or negative, which depends on 
how consumers associate the competing brand with the scandalized brand (i.e. context brand).  
According to Herr (1989), the degree of associative overlap between brands determines how 
a brand relates to the context brand. Similarity can be used to represent such associative overlap. 
The more similarity there is between a brand and the context brand, the higher the degree of 
associative overlap (Herr, 1989). A high degree of associations between brands fosters 
assimilation whereby a as low degree of associations between brands fosters contrast 
(Meyers-Levy & Sternthal, 1993). If a brand (e.g., a brand in the same product category) is 
dissimilar to the scandalized brand (i.e. the context brand), consumers may evaluate the brand 
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with contrast. Consumers consider the scandal as a result of one brand’s unique behavior, thus 
the brand scandal is taken as non-diagnostic for the category or competing brand. Such a contrast 
leads to a positive evaluation of the dissimilar brand. The negative spillover does not happen 
(Roehm & Tybout, 2006). However, if a brand is similar to a scandalized brand, consumers 
evaluate the brand with assimilation, indicating that they evaluate the competing brand similar as 
to how they would evaluate the scandalized brand. Therefore, the brand-harm crisis negatively 
affects evaluations of the similar brand. A brand-harm crisis indeed spills over to other brands, 
such as the competing brand, or even the product category (Dahlen & Lange, 2006).  
In the light of the mechanisms above, one can realize that similarity between a scandalized 
brand and other brands plays a significant role during the negative spillover process. Similarity 
can increase the accessibility and perceived diagnosticity. It also determines whether consumers 
use assimilation or contrast when they relate other brands to the scandalized brand. However, the 
underlying function of similarity is to describe the association among brands; we still need to 
know more about why and how such associations affect negative spillover. Lei et al. (2008)’s 
research provides a better understanding of this rationale by using the associative network theory.  
2.2.3 The Associative Network Theory 
According to the associative network theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975), a brand is 
represented by a node in the consumer’s memory. The paths or linkages among those nodes show 
the relationships among brands. The more attributes two brands share, the more paths or linkages 
exist between them, making these two brands connected to each other strongly (Ulhaque & Bahn, 
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1992). Coming to the spillover in a brand network, according to Collins and Loftus (1975), it can 
be represented in two steps: 1) the retrieval of related brand nodes and 2) their updating. The 
“retrieval” in the first step is caused by “spreading activation” through the association network 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). According to spreading activation theory, activation facilitates the 
transfer of information from long-term memory to working memory. Sufficient levels of 
activation may exist in some (frequently or recently seen) brand nodes or can even "spread" from 
internally generated or external retrieval cues to other brands (brand nodes). Thus, retrieving a 
brand is a direct function of nodal strengths of activation (Nedungadi, 1990).  
Following this logic, the mechanism behind scandal spillover between brands can be 
considered as a spreading activation across a brand’s associative network. When the memory of 
Brand A and Brand A’s nodes are activated by negative brand publicity (i.e., an external 
information prime), the memory of Brand B and its nodes may also be activated because Brand 
B is in the same brand network as Brand A. Thus, the activation will spill over from Brand A to 
Brand B through the associative network paths or linkages that the two brands share. 
Furthermore, the nodes of Brand B are changed as well due to the activation. Therefore, how 
Brand A and Brand B associate with each other in the brand’s associative network determines the 
spillover effect. The strength and directionality of association affect the pattern of spillover 
between brands. In this case, even though Brand B is not mentioned in the brand-harm crisis 
message, consumers may still think of Brand B. Previous work used this theory to study negative 
spillover in brand portfolios (Lei et al., 2008).  
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In conclusion, scholars have studied the mechanisms of the spillover effect by exploring the 
nature of brand scandal, the associations among brands, and consumers’ processing of the brand 
scandal. In fact, these supportive rationales also provide clues for companies to respond to the 
negative spillover.  
2.3 Response to Negative Spillover 
Scandalized brands or companies always face the financial losses and damage to the brand 
image or company reputation. Luckily, firms still have a chance to provide more information to 
consumers, such as issuing a response to the brand-harm crisis. Firms’ responses represent the 
words and actions that managers use in dealing with crises (Coombs, 2007b). The response can 
be taken as a chance to reduce the negative effect that the crisis brings to the firm or brand by 
influencing how people perceive the crisis and the scandalized company. It is also the only 
opportunity for firms to deliver information to consumers directly.  
Just as a scandalized brand (or company) can be affected, related brands (or companies), 
which suffer from a brand-harm crisis, also face extensive financial losses and damage to their 
reputation. These companies can also consider issuing a response to alleviate the negative effect.  
Roehm and Tybout (2006), one of the most recognized studies about how competitors 
should reply to negative spillover, discussed the importance of the denial strategy, compared to 
keeping silence. They found out that when consumers do not believe a competing brand engages 
in the scandalous behaviour, denial might trigger a boomerang effect. According to studies on 
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communication norms, messages that contain the redundant meaning with the current attitude are 
not literally informative (Gruenfeld & Wyer, 1992). Thus, if the consumers already believe the 
competing brand does not engage in the crisis, a message that the denial response delivers is 
likely to be perceived as redundant. Consumers will not process the denial response literally, 
indicating consumers may start to believe the competing brand does engage in the crisis, and a 
negative spillover hence occurs after all. 
In contrast, when scandal spillover has occurred (i.e. consumers already believe that the 
competing brand got involved in the brand-harm crisis), issuing a denial response reduces more 
negative spillover than keeping silence does. The main reason is that the denial message is new 
information to consumers, which can be processed literally and informatively. The denial 
response motivates a corrective process. During this process, consumers can update their 
attitudes towards and beliefs about the competing brand based on the denial message. Eventually, 
the attitude and belief become more favorable. If a competitor keeps silence, the corrective 
process will not be triggered and the negative attitudes or beliefs remain.    
However, using the existence of negative spillover of a brand-harm crisis to determine 
which response strategy, denial or silence, should be used is arbitrary. Even though the negative 
spillover occurs, a denial response may still cause problematic consequences.  
First, denial, as a correction, can bring unintended side effects (Darke et al., 2008). The 
correction message itself can be misunderstood easily (Jacoby, Nelson, & Hoyer, 1982). Besides, 
consumers only provide limited memory for the information in the corrective message (Mazis, 
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McNeill, & Bernhardt, 1983). The unintended effect also can take place in the information 
source: the firm that releases the corrective message. For example, a firm’s reputation can be 
undermined, especially for those firms whose previous reputations are high (Johar, 1996). 
Consumers may also question other products which are produced by the same firm but are not 
mentioned in the corrective message (Dyer & Kuehl, 1978; Mazis & Adkinson, 1976). 
Second, except reducing the negative spillover effect, a denial message may bring unwanted 
results, such as higher expectations of the competing brand. After consumers process the denial 
message literally, the attitudes towards or beliefs about the competing brand become favorable. 
Meanwhile, the expectations of the competing brand also increase. As a result, if the competing 
brand is exposed to have the same brand-harm crisis or does not satisfy consumers, consumers 
may evaluate the competing brand even more negatively (Darke, Ashworth, & Main, 2010). 
Compared to silence, a denial response indeed brings more risks.  
Third, existing consumers may process the denial message differently. When a scandal 
occurs, consumers’ hopes that the product can help them reach goals are threatened. Consumers, 
especially existing consumers, may initiate motivated reasoning (De Mello, MacInnis, & Stewart, 
2007). Applying the idea of motivated reasoning to a brand-harm crisis context, information and 
information resources that are favorable to a scandalized brand are considered as credible by 
existing consumers. Consumers may even proactively search for favorable information or 
information resources. On the other hand, a denial response from a competitor indicates the 
“innocence” of the competing brand and highlights the “guilt” of scandalized brand. Such denial 
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threatens the hope that a scandalized brand has good performance, and reminds the consumers 
that they have made an unwise purchase decision. Existing consumers may consider the denial 
message as unfavorable information, and the competitor as a low-credibility information 
resource (MacInnis & De Mello, 2005). Therefore, the denial message is not able to make more 
favorable consumer attitudes toward and beliefs about the competing brand. 
Fourth, a denial message itself is a negation and the processing of a negation is more 
complicated than the processing of an affirmation. Clark and Chase (1972) pointed out that an 
encoding negation is more time-consuming than a processing affirmation because negation 
contains an additional operator, the negation operator, which is separated or dissociated from the 
message’s core concept. For example, this mobile phone is not black. “Not” is the negation 
operator and “this mobile phone is black” is the core concept. Theories from social psychology 
and linguistics indicate that the processing of a negation (i.e. denial in this study) may follow the 
schema-plus-tag model: affirmation first, negation tag next. These two steps dissociate each 
other at a later point in time (Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal, 2004). For example, when KFC was 
exposed to use contaminated food materials, KFC responded to the crisis claiming that we 
“never” (negation tag) “use contaminated materials for our products” (affirmation). After reading 
the response, consumers may process the negated message with negation-incongruent 
associations (Mayo et al., 2004). As such, an impression may be created that KFC indeed uses 
contaminated materials. A denial response still hurts KFC. Thus, a denial response itself may not 
make consumers’ attitudes toward and beliefs about the competing brand more favorable. 
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Meanwhile, affirmation has its own advantage. The initial resource assigns a priority to the 
distribution of affirmation (Just & Carpenter, 1976). It means that processing negation needs 
more cognitive resources than processing affirmation (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993). Other 
research also shows that after a delay, affirmation is more accessible than negation (Fiedler, 
Walther, Armbruster, Fay, & Naumann, 1996).  
To sum up, issuing a denial should not be an automatic reaction when a similar brand in the 
same product category is involved in a scandal. A more elaborated study about the competitors’ 
denial strategy presented is needed. In fact, a competitor has many methods to deliver the denial 
message to consumers. Competitors can provide a straightforward form, just as prior research 
does. Competitors can use the metaphor to present the denial. Hence, it is important for 
marketing researchers or marketers to figure out what is the alternative way to deliver a denial 
response.  
Before discussing this issue, we need to emphasize the ultimate goal of any response 
strategy from the competitor: to distance the competing brand from the scandal. In other words, a 
competitor of the scandalized company wants to deliver a message: a competing brand or 
company does not want involvement in the brand-harm crisis. Hence, the process of presenting a 
response is a process of sensemaking. 
2.4 Sensemaking  
Weick (1979) introduced the concept of “sensemaking” for the first time. Sensemaking is 
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defined as meaning creation based current and prior interpretations of thoughts. These thoughts 
can come from three sources: retrieval from internal memory, external stimuli, and seemingly 
random focus in working memory (Woodside, 2001). Together, sensemaking includes both 
explicit and implicit mental processes of constructing, framing, creating and rendering a view. At 
first, the concept of sensemaking was not used widely in consumer research, but rather in 
organizational studies. It is used to present a communicative interplay between an organization 
and its stakeholders, among stakeholders, and even within individual stakeholders (Press & 
Arnould, 2011). Such an interplay makes sensemaking a key process to build organization 
identification (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Weick, 1995). For example, employees can 
observe sensemaking through dressing, office decoration, performances, and behaviours, factors 
that follow to norms of organizational identify (Ashforth et al., 2008). From a consumer’s 
perspective, the identification of an organization can also be disseminated through sensemaking 
activities, such as from a company’s related rites, rituals and routines (Bhattacharya & Sen, 
2003). However, this concept applies to the marketing context; the marketing decision is a kind 
of information that marketers want the employees or consumers to accept. To make the 
acceptance happen, marketers need to interpret the available information at a particular point in 
time to consumers and employees, referred as sensemaking (Ford, Gadde, Hakansson, & Snehota, 
2003; Weick, 1979, 1995). Such interpretive work that a company provides can help consumers 
or employees make sense of brands, marketing communications, service personnel, and firms 
(Fournier 1998).  
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There are a few actions aimed at influencing individuals to make sense in a particular way. 
In this study, we focus on two of them: sensegiving and sensehiding.  
2.4.1 Sensegiving  
Sensegiving refers to the communicative process of influencing the “meaning construction 
of others toward a preferred organizational reality” (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). It provides the 
materials to make constituents recognize how to behave in the organization (Ashforth et al., 
2008). It can help an organization to reorder the priorities or disrupt the established or regulation 
relationships. In short, sensegiving corresponds to the concept of “saying out” (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005).  
The main differences between these two concepts are that sensemaking refers to a 
communicative interplay between organization and employee or consumers, and sensegiving is 
more like a one-way communication, from organization to employees or to consumers (Press & 
Arnould, 2011). The sensemaking process shows how managers understand, interpret and create 
sense for the organization and gain support from organization constituents (Rouleau, 2005). The 
process of sensegiving is concerned with managers’ attempts to influence the outcome, to 
communicate their thoughts about the change to other stakeholders, especially when external 
environments change (Rouleau, 2005). The difference explains why sensemaking needs to be 
complemented by sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). To achieve the success of strategic 
change, organization constituents have to get a good understanding and accept the new strategy. 
Therefore, what and how sensegiving presents the strategic change is the critical point.  
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Strategic change not only happens in structures and processes, but also shifts the cognitive 
organizational reorientation (Barr, 1998). Hence, strategic change often involves symbolic 
struggles over the purpose or mission of the organization. From the social movement view, 
framing, defined as a “decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 4538), has been used to 
understand the symbolic struggle over the meaning of strategic change (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Therefore, as a method that can help constituents understand and accept the strategy that 
involves symbolic struggles, sensegiving presents how strategic change is framed and diffused to 
an organization’s constituents (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). A proper framing of sensegiving can help an 
organization reach the success of strategic change. In short, framing can be understood as 
“schemata of interpretation”(Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986). To get a proper 
framing, managers can manipulate the interpretation diversity in order to cater different 
audiences. The manipulation can be conducted through selectively punctuating and encoding 
(Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994).  
Prior research has explored the role of sensegiving within various studies. For example, 
how sensegiving creates an organizational development initiative (Bartunek et al., 1999), how 
leaders use sensegiving to represent an attempt to provide the new label (Corley & Gioia, 2004), 
why senior managers’ sensegiving about events, which is surrounded by strategic changes, is 
significant in narrative (Dunford and Jones, 2000), or how ideas, raising issues, and questioning 
assumptions can be delivered through sensegiving activities (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999).  
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The existence of a spillover effect of a brand-harm crisis is a situation that a competitor 
usually can not predict or control. In other words, a negative spillover effect may force a 
competitor to have a strategic change. Hence, a sensemaking process is needed. Sensegiving is 
an effective strategy because its unique “saying out loud” concept can help stakeholders 
understand how a competitor deals with the negative spillover more quickly and clearly. That 
makes managers of competing companies regard sensegiving as an automatic reaction. However, 
besides the sensegiving’ “loud and clear” interpretation of strategic change, sensehiding can also 
be used to make sense. The “low-key” style of sensehiding does not preclude such a strategy as 
being a useful one to make sense of.  
2.4.2 Sensehiding 
Comparing sensemaking and sensehiding, sensehiding is a relatively new concept. 
Researchers started to use this concept in organizational studies since 2010. It shows how images 
become distorted or manipulated through holding back a particular aspect (Vaara & Monin, 
2010). To reach the purpose of holding back, certain discourses have to be consciously avoided 
during the process (Mahapatra & Pattnaik, 2013). Two methods are used in the sensehiding 
process: silencing the alternative discourse, and marginalizing the particular voice (Monin, 
Noorderhaven, Vaara, & Kroon, 2012). In Monin et al.’s (2012) study, an excellent example was 
given: “Top management focused extensively on ‘equality’ and ‘balance’ during the first years 
but deliberately avoided using the term ‘merger.’ Later ‘fairness’ was linked more with equity, 
and ‘the M-word’ was re-appropriated, but terms such as ‘takeover’ remained taboo.” In the 
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example above, managers may silence the term “merger”, and marginalize the meaning of 
“fairness” by using “equality” and “balance”. The example also shows the vocabulary in the 
message can be dynamic.  
The research related to sensehiding is very limited. Prior studies have used sensehiding as a 
tool to conduct a merger (van Vuuren, 2011), to build the justice in post-merger integration 
(Monin et al., 2012), to present the strategic change (Mahapatra & Pattnaik, 2013), and to 
understand the commitment of failure from a celebrity CEO and other stakeholders (Sinha et al., 
2012). Obviously, the concept of sensehiding has not been systematically explored. The main 
reason is the examining of taboos or the unsaid is difficult to conducted methodologically 
(Monin et al., 2012). However, we still can use framing to understand the interpretation in 
sensehiding because framing can also been made through simply keeping some factors, while 
hiding others (Williams & Benford, 2000). It is likely the concept of framing can help to set our 
understanding of sensehiding through the process of hiding.  
Before further discussion about the application of sensemaking, sensegiving and 
sensehiding in a brand-harm crisis study, the relationships among these three concepts need to be 
clarified. Currently, there is no unified hierarchy among them. Some researchers consider 
sensegiving and sensehiding are the methods of sensemaking (van Vuuren, 2012). Some scholars 
regard sensegiving and sensemaking in the same layer, and sensehiding, sensebreaking and sense 
specification are the tools to deliver the sense (Monin et al., 2012). There is also one study that 
considers sensehiding, sensegiving and sensemaking in the same level (Chan, Johansen, & Moor, 
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2011). From a message framing perspective (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1996), it is conceptually 
sound to treat sensegiving and sensehiding as the two separate message strategies in marketing 
communications.   
After a brand-harm crisis, a company may consider communicating with consumers about 
the cause of the crisis, attribution of the crisis, or how to respond. These communications help 
consumers make sense of a crisis and eventually update the identification of the brand or the 
organization. For a competitor of the scandalized company, sensemaking is also important 
because such interactions can help to reduce the negative spillover effect through the proper 
response strategy. The concepts related to sensegiving or sensehiding can be used to explore how 
a competitor of a scandalized brand (or company) should respond to negative spillover from a 
brand-harm crisis.  
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3. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Theoretical Model 
 The core theoretical framework used in this study is the associative-network theory, 
according to which semantic memory or knowledge consists of a set of nodes and links (Collins 
& Loftus, 1975). Nodes comprise information stored in the memory. A brand’s associative 
network contains two kinds of nodes: brand nodes, such as “McDonald’s,” and nodes associated 
with the brand, such as a picture of a hamburger or a large yellow letter “M”. The connections 
between nodes vary in strength. The movement from node to node, known as spreading 
activation, determines the extent of retrieval from the memory. This process connects brands via 
shared associative nodes (Keller, 1993). The stronger the association between two brands, the 
more likely spillover is to occur. Brand relatedness describes the strength of association between 
two brands and it offers a useful tool for exploration of the negative-spillover effects of a 
brand-harm crisis (Lei et al., 2008).  
Drawing on previous organizational research (Weick, 1995; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Monin et al., 2012), we identified two main denial message strategies: “sensegiving” and 
“sensehiding.” The effectiveness of these two types of denial message on reducing the 
negative-spillover effect of a brand-harm crisis may differ. Generally, we expect sensegiving 
messages to more effectively mitigate negative spillover. Moreover, denial strategy interacts with 
brand relatedness on reducing negative spillover. When brand relatedness is high, a sensegiving 
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strategy is expected to mitigate negative spillover much more effectively than a sensehiding 
strategy. When brand relatedness is low, the difference between the effects of the two strategies is 
relatively small. We also propose that individual thinking styles, namely analytical vs. holistic 
thinking (I. Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007), influence the interaction effects of brand relatedness and 
denial strategy. Analytical thinking refers to a cognitive strategy which pays attention on the 
attributes of each component object so that the phenomenon can be assigned into a certain 
category. With the categorization, analytical thinking can explain and predict the phenomenon. 
Holistic thinking, on the other hand, refers to a cognitive strategy which combines a phenomenon 
with its context. Such thinking also considers the causality between the components of the 
phenomenon (Nisbett et al., 2001). When brand relatedness is high, both denial strategies are 
more likely to persuade holistic thinkers than analytical thinkers. When brand relatedness is low, 
the two denial strategies are more likely to convince analytical thinkers than holistic thinkers.  
Three general hypotheses are developed in this study. Hypothesis 1 concerns the main effect 
of denial message strategy on the negative spillover from brand-harm crisis. Hypothesis 2 
presents the interaction between brand relatedness and denial messages strategy. Hypothesis 3 
quantifies the effect on negative spillover of the interaction between individual thinking styles 
(analytical vs. holistic thinking), brand relatedness, and denial message strategy.  
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3.2 Main Effects of Denial Strategies on Spillover  
3.2.1 Denial as the Sense  
Before discussing sensegiving and sensehiding, it is important to note that regardless of 
message type (including silence) competitors witnessing a brand-harm crisis sometimes seek to 
persuade consumers that their brands were not involved in the crisis. This persuasive strategy is 
itself a sensemaking process. Marketers in the competing company need to implement strategies 
to distance the competing brand from the brand-harm crisis and/or the brand involved in the 
scandal. A sensemaking process can help to deliver the intended message—denial of 
involvement—to stakeholders such as consumers. As one of the simplest and common linguistic 
devices, which requires its audience to consider alternative possibilities (Hasson & Glucksberg, 
2006), negation seems the obvious choice of vehicle for a denial message. A negation message 
contains two parts: a negation tag, such as “no,” “never,” or “not,” and the core concept negated 
(Mayo et al., 2004). Therefore, the comprehension of a negation message depends on individuals’ 
ability to construct and evaluate alternatives. In the context of a brand-harm crisis, consumers 
process information on the crisis and evaluate the innocence of the competitor (i.e. the 
alternative). Therefore, negation offers an effective sensemaking tool for denial, and constitutes 
an important topic of linguistic research.  
3.2.2 Sensegiving Denial Response 
According to Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), sensegiving is “concerned with the process of 
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attempting to influence the meaning construction of others (i.e. organization members) toward a 
preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (page 442). To deliver a message of denial 
successfully, a sensegiving strategy must provide a clear “signature” of negation (i.e. a negation 
tag).  
If consumers do not recollect a competing brand when they learn of a brand-harm crisis, the 
competitor does not experience negative spillover. As denial is pre-empted, any negation 
message delivered to consumers may have a boomerang effect, which implies that the target 
audience already believes that the brand engages in the scandal behavior after receiving the 
negation message (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Under these circumstances, sensemaking is 
unnecessary. If spillover does occur, however, competitors need to persuade consumers to accept 
their denial of involvement. Roehm and Tybout (2006) cited the following real-world denial 
response: “Wendy’s has never and will never mislead customers about the nutritional content of 
any of its menu items” (page 369). Linguistically, this message of denial is a negation sentence, 
as it contains both a negation tag, “never,” and the core negated concept, the possibility that the 
company has misled or will mislead customers about the nutritional content of its products 
(Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006). The negation tag reflects the company’s attempt to explicitly 
convey denial. Therefore, this message is an example of sensegiving. A sensegiving denial 
response made by a competitor should involve a direct statement of negation; for instance, 
“Subway® has never used contaminated materials from unreliable suppliers.”  
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3.2.3 Sensehiding Denial Response 
A sensehiding denial message has the same purpose as a sensegiving denial message: to 
persuade consumers to accept a denial. Therefore, a sensehiding message is also a denial 
message strategy. When negative spillover from a brand-harm crisis occurs, consumers 
negatively evaluate competing brands. As a result, competitors need to proactively convince 
consumers of their success to mitigate the adverse effects of the brand-harm crisis. In other 
words, the denial content of a sensehiding message is delivered by encouraging consumers to 
think positively about a competing brand while concealing any relationship with the brand in 
crisis (Vaara & Monin, 2010). Previous researchers have identified two methods of sensehiding: 
silencing alternative discourse and marginalizing a particular voice (Monin et al., 2012). In this 
study, we focus on the second method: marginalizing the expression of denial. This method 
removes the risk associated with negation, the linguistic device central to sensegiving. However, 
consumer inquiry may require competing companies to deliver further reassurance to reduce the 
negative-spillover effect. Is it possible to convey negation without using a negation tag?  
Prior researchers have framed negation as either implicit or explicit (Evans et al., 1996). For 
example, to present the negation statement in the following sentence: “The number is ‘4’”, the 
explicit statement is “The number is not ‘4’”. Such a statement can also be implicitly expressed 
as follows: “The number is ‘7’”, because a number cannot be 4 and 7 in the same time. Explicit 
negation contains a negation tag, whereas implicit negation is in fact a form of affirmation. 
Inspired by prior studies, we consider affirmation the linguistic device central to sensehiding. 
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Companies using a sensehiding strategy do not directly negate imputations of their involvement 
in a crisis; instead, their denial is delivered through affirmation. Take the following sensehiding 
strategy: “Subway® only uses high-quality materials from creditable suppliers.” This type of 
affirmation is designed to lead consumers indirectly to the intended sense: denial of involvement 
in a crisis.  
In conclusion, we frame the denial message strategies of competitors as either sensegiving 
or sensehiding, based on the wording of their denial messages (negative or affirmative, 
respectively). Sensegiving removes the risk that consumers will misinterpret a negation (Ahearne, 
Gruen, & Saxton, 2000). However, sensegiving may lead to the abovementioned boomerang 
effect. Sensehiding reduces the likelihood that consumers will associate a competing brand with 
a brand-harm crisis or the brand involved in the scandal. However, receivers may fail to 
comprehend the intended negation (Ahearne et al., 2000), as explained by the fusion model 
(Mayo et al., 2004).   
According to the fusion model, individuals who receive a sensehiding message are likely to 
fuse the negation tag with the core concept. As a result, the negation may be cognitively 
transformed into an affirmation (Mayo et al., 2004). For example, the message “I am not guilty” 
may be transformed into its affirmative counterpart, coding “I am innocent.” Unfortunately, “not 
guilty” and “innocent” differ not only in degree or positivity, but are conceptually distinct 
(Gannon & Ostrom, 1996). When negative spillover occurs, competitors hope to persuade 
consumers to build an indelible impression that the competing brand or company is unconnected 
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to the brand-harm crisis. A claim of innocence is not sufficient to build such an impression, 
because it fails to associate the competing brand with the brand-harm crisis, preventing a clear 
denial of involvement. In contrast, using the negative version of the message - “not guilty” - may 
significantly reduce negative spillover. Therefore, the use of a sensehiding strategy is expected to 
be less effective than the use of a sensegiving strategy.  
In short, the subtle differences in the message framing of sensegiving and sensehiding 
denial strategies likely lead to different reactions by the target audiences. In line with the 
theoretical arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1: Sensegiving denial strategy is more effective than sensehiding denial strategy with 
respect to reducing negative spillover effect. 
3.3 Brand Relatedness  
3.3.1 Brand Relatedness and Similarity 
Brand relatedness denotes the strength of association between brands (Lei et al., 2008). It is 
cultivated through marketing features such as a common brand name, a similar logo or 
packaging design, or related advertising (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000; Sanchez, 2004). 
Most previous researchers have addressed the relationship between a brand involved in a 
scandal and a competing brand in terms of similarity, not brand relatedness. For instance, Roehm 
and Tybout (2006) defined brand similarity as a function of the common attributes of two brands, 
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and argued that similar scandal-related attributes are the basis of negative spillover from a brand 
in crisis to competing brands. However, similar attributes only partly reflect the association 
between brands. Relatedness is a more inclusive construct than similarity (Farquhar & Herr, 
1993). Brand relatedness is determined not only by the similarity of shared brand attributes, but 
also by the substitutability or complementarity of brands; that is, the extent to which they provide 
a common utility function or operate complementarily in the same context of usage (Aaker & 
Keller, 1990; Park, Milberg, & Lawson, 1991). Compared with brand similarity, brand 
relatedness is also a better measure of the conceptual relationship between two brands (Herr, 
Farquhar, & Fazio, 1996). In sum, brand relatedness more accurately represents the strength of 
association between brands (Morrin, 1999). Therefore, after spillover occurs (i.e. the brand 
involved in the scandal is perceived as similar to a competitor sharing scandal-related attributes) 
brand relatedness can provide further clues about the effectiveness of a competitor’s denial 
message strategy.  
3.3.2 Interaction Effect of Denial Strategy and Brand Relatedness  
When a brand node (or “initial brand”) is recalled or activated by external information such 
as advertising, this activation spreads to related brand nodes (or “competing brands”) in the 
brand network. The stronger the relatedness between the initial brand and the competing brand, 
the greater the extent to which information on the competing brand is updated with reference to 
the initial brand. When the external information has a negative valence (i.e. in the wake of a 
brand scandal), information on both the brand in crisis and a competing brand is likely to be 
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updated (Ahluwalia, 2002). The extent to which updating occurs (i.e. the negative-spillover 
effect) depends on the strength of association between the two brands. The stronger the 
association between the brands, the more negative information spills over to the competing brand 
(Chapman & Aylesworth, 1999; Fazio, 2001).  
Following a brand-harm crisis, consumers are more likely to perceive a competing brand as 
“guilty” when brand relatedness is high. Consumers’ doubts about the potential involvement of 
the competing brand become salient. Moreover, these doubts may not only be stored in the 
memory but may lead consumers to search for clues to possible connections with the brand-harm 
crisis (Aaker & Keller, 1990). As a result, consumers’ attitudes toward or beliefs about the 
competing brand may be affected. A disappointing response from the competitor is likely to 
further injure the competing brand. To mitigate this negative-spillover effect, competitors may 
adopt a sensegiving strategy when brand relatedness is high. The combination of a negation tag 
and the core concept clearly convey the competitor’s denial of involvement in the brand-harm 
crisis. This highly explicit negation is likely to reduce consumers’ suspicion. In contrast, the 
affirmation conveyed in a sensehiding message may not allow the competitor to deny explicitly 
its connection with the brand-harm crisis, because the message contains neither an allusion to the 
crisis nor a negation tag. As a result, the use of a sensegiving strategy is expected to be more 
effective than the use of a sensehiding strategy when brand relatedness is high.  
When brand relatedness is low, negative spillover from a brand-harm crisis may still occur. 
However, consumers are less likely to clearly recollect the competing brand. In addition, fewer 
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competing-brand nodes are activated. Suspicions about the involvement of competing brands are 
likely to be stored only in consumers’ short-term/working memory as cognitive content, and thus 
to vanish quickly (Chapman & Aylesworth, 1999). Consumers are also less inclined to inquire 
actively into the competitor’s behavior. As a result, the negative spillover from a brand-harm 
crisis is smaller when brand relatedness is low. When little negative spillover has occurred, the 
negation tag and core concept contained in a sensegiving message may be less effective in 
reducing the negative-spillover effect. Therefore, the sensegiving strategy is expected to more 
effectively mitigate the negative effects of a scandal when brand relatedness is low. Nevertheless, 
the sensegiving strategy is still more effective than the sensehiding strategy in conditions of low 
brand relatedness. As in the case of high brand relatedness, the affirmation conveyed in a 
sensehiding message does not activate the connection between the competing brand and the 
brand-harm crisis. Therefore, consumers may not relate the positive information contained in the 
message to the brand-harm crisis. As a result, their attitudes toward or beliefs about the 
competing brand may deteriorate on subsequent exposure to the brand-harm crisis, because the 
sensehiding message has failed to ensure that the competitor’s denial of involvement is retained 
in consumers’ long-term memory.  
In general, we expect sensegiving to be more effective than sensehiding in reducing the 
negative-spillover effect. We further postulate that the interaction between brand relatedness and 
denial strategy affects the extent to which each strategy is capable of mitigating negative 
spillover. Specifically, the difference between the effect of a sensegiving message and that of a 
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sensehiding message is expected to be greater when brand relatedness is high, compared with the 
low brand relatedness condition. In other words, when brand relatedness is low, the sensegiving 
message is only slightly more effective than the sensehiding message in reducing the 
negative-spillover effect; when brand relatedness is high, the effect of the sensegiving message is 
much greater than that of the sensehiding message. Based on this reasoning, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The differential effect of sensegiving and sensehiding denial strategies on reducing 
negative spillover effect is greater when brand relatedness is higher (vs. low). 
 
3.3.3 Interaction between Denial Strategy, Brand Relatedness, and Thinking Style  
In addition to studies of brand association, previous researchers have investigated the effects 
of factors such as the nature of the brand scandal (Dawar & Lei, 2009), consumer characteristics 
(Ahluwalia et al., 2000), and the type of information available (Dutta & Pullig, 2011) on 
consumers’ processing of a brand crisis and the response of the company in crisis. In this study, 
we investigate the influence of thinking style, an individual characteristic, on consumers’ 
processing of a competitor’s denial message.  
Nisbett and his colleagues examined the effects of thinking style on various cognitive 
domains, such as attention (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), attribution 
(I. Choi & Nisbett, 1998), memory (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001), logical reasoning (Norenzayan, 
Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002), and categorization (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001). In addition, cultural 
  
 
40 
differences in the cognitive outcomes of different styles of thinking have been explored (Choi, 
Koo, & Choi, 2007). These findings provide initial theoretical support for the influence of 
individual thinking styles on the effectiveness of a denial message. 
(1) Thinking Style and Brand-harm Crisis 
Two main thinking styles have been identified: analytical and holistic. Monga and John 
(2008) found that thinking styles play different roles in alleviating the negative effect of 
brand-harm crisis on the brand involved, because individuals with analytical and holistic 
thinking styles perform differently in the attribution domain (Choi et al., 1998). Holistic thinkers 
tend to prioritize context-based explanations, and are thus more likely to attribute a crisis to 
external causes. Analytical thinkers are less likely to consider contextual factors, and thus are 
more likely to attribute a crisis to internal causes. Holistic and analytical thinkers also perform 
differently in the domains of attention location and formal logic, and are thus likely to process a 
competitor’s denial message differently (Nisbett, et.al, 2001).  
 (2) Brand Relatedness and Individual Thinking Styles 
The holistic thinking style seems to be common among East Asians. Holistic thinkers tend 
to focus on the relationships between objects and the environment to which objects belong 
(Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). Compared with analytical thinkers, holistic thinkers are more likely 
to see the “whole picture” than a single component, and are less able to separate a single object 
from the field in which the object is embedded. Individuals with a holistic thinking style are 
good at identifying relationships between objects (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). In contrast, 
  
 
41 
analytical thinkers pay more attention to an object than to the category to which it belongs. The 
analytical thinking style is more common among Westerners, who tend to focus on individual 
components rather than the whole picture. In addition, analytical thinkers find it more difficult to 
identify relationships between objects (Ji et al., 2000). They are thus less likely to make 
connections between a brand-harm crisis, the brand in crisis, and a competing brand. Holistic 
thinkers are generally more acutely aware of the relationship between a brand in crisis and a 
competing brand. As these two types of thinking style lead individuals to perform differently in 
the attention domain, they affect consumers’ processing of competitors’ denial messages. Even 
when brand relatedness is low, holistic thinkers are more likely to identify relationships between 
brands than analytical thinkers are. The stronger the perceived association between two brands, 
the greater the negative spillover. In contrast, analytical thinkers are more likely to regard the 
brand in crisis and the competing brand as separate entities. Therefore, brand-harm crisis and 
denial message strategies have little influence on their impressions of competing brands. In short, 
holistic thinkers are expected to produce more negative initial evaluations of competing brands. 
After exposure to the same denial strategy, the differential effects of holistic and analytic 
thinking styles interact with the effects of brand relatedness.  
If a brand-harm crisis occurs when brand relatedness is high, consumers’ vivid memories of 
the affected brand lead to rapid connections between brands due to “spreading activation” (Herr 
et al., 1996). Analytical thinkers and holistic thinkers perceive a similar level of brand 
relatedness, due to the strong association between brands and the considerable negative spillover. 
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In these circumstances, therefore, the differential effects of thinking style are no longer caused 
by differences in attention allocation but by different approaches to logic. Previous research has 
shown that holistic thinkers seldom use formal logic (I. Choi et al., 2007). Instead, they rely 
heavily on “dialectical” reasoning (Nisbett et al., 2001). The holistic thinking style is 
characterized by contrast and conflict. Holistic thinkers tend to seek a middle ground between 
different, even contradictory, evaluations. Therefore, consumers with a holistic thinking style 
usually process contradictory information through dialectical reasoning and compromise. In 
contrast, analytical thinkers do not hold negative and positive opinions at the same time. They 
use existing rules or formal logic to interpret phenomena (Nisbett et al., 2001). Therefore, 
analytical consumers choose information that either supports or indicts a brand.  
When negative spillover from a brand-harm crisis occurs, consumers gain a negative 
impression of a competing brand by connecting the brand in crisis with the competing brand. The 
negation contained in a sensegiving message can help to weaken the links made between the 
brand-harm crisis, the brand involved, and competing brands, and thus encourage consumers to 
view the competitor more positively. This negation opposes the perception of the competitor as 
“guilty” elicited by negative spillover. Therefore, a sensegiving message delivered by a 
competing brand is less likely to reduce the negative-spillover effect among analytical thinkers 
than among holistic thinkers, as the latter are better able to accommodate contradictory 
information. As holistic thinkers accept that the judgments of “guilty” and “not guilty” can 
co-exist, and seek to find a compromise between these positions, the negative-spillover effect is 
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reduced by sensegiving. In contrast, analytical thinkers evaluate the competing brand as either 
“guilty” or “not guilty,” as they cannot hold positive and negative information at the same time. 
According to negative-bias theory, negative information has greater diagnosticity than positive 
information (Fiske, 1980; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993). Additionally, consumers 
receive negative information concerning the competitor’s involvement in the crisis before 
positive information is delivered in the sensegiving message. In line with the primacy-effect 
theory, analytical thinkers are more likely to retain the negative information on the competing 
brand since people recall the first items more frequently than the later items (Levin & Gaeth, 
1988). Compared with holistic thinkers, analytical thinkers are expected to form more negative 
evaluations of the competing brand after receiving a sensegiving message. Similarly, sensehiding 
messages offer positive information on the competing brand in the form of an affirmation. Due to 
the primacy effect, analytic thinkers are again likely to prioritize the negative information.  
In sum, individual thinking styles interact with the effects of brand relatedness on 
consumers’ reactions to the two denial message strategies. Specifically, we expect the interaction 
effects between brand relatedness and the two types of denial message to be less pronounced 
among analytical thinkers than among holistic thinkers. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis. 
H3: The interaction effect of brand relatedness and denial strategy (sensegiving vs. 
sensehiding) on negative spillover is influenced by individual thinking styles, such that 
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the interaction effect between a denial message strategy and brand relatedness is 
greater among analytical (holistic) thinkers than among holistic (analytical) thinkers 
when brand relatedness is low (high). 
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4. RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 Pretests 
A series of pretests were conducted to determine what materials were suitable, what stimuli 
were related to the scandalized brand, and the key competing brands in the main studies. The 
materials for each experiment included a scandalized brand, competing brand(s) with different 
levels of brand relatedness, and a brand-harm crisis scenario, which could cause negative 
spillover to the competing brand(s).  
4.1.1 Pretest 1  
The purpose of the first pretest was to find the proper scandalized brand for each 
experiment. Previous studies have shown that a brand-harm crisis is likely to spillover when the 
scandalized brand is typical of the product category (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Hence, the 
purpose of Pretest 1 was to find out the most typical brand in each category. 
Undergraduate students of a Southern University in China were the participants in this 
pretest. The participants were asked to write down four brands each for the toothpaste, fast food, 
and sports shoe categories. According to previous research, a typical brand should be 
representative of the category (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Therefore, we asked the participants to 
rank the four brands based on the extent to which they represented the category where they 
belonged. On a four-point scale, the number “1” referred to the least typical and the number “4” 
indicated the most typical. The number was used as weight of each brand. Based on the 
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frequency of number (i.e. the weight) and weight of each brand, we selected the brand with the 
highest value as the scandalized brand for each category and the brands with the highest 
frequency in the third question as the competing brands of the scandalized brand.  
Forty-two undergraduate students from a Chinese university participated in the first pretest, 
related to the sports shoe category. Eighty-one percent of the participants chose Nike as the brand 
that most represented the category. Forty-five undergraduate students were recruited for the 
pretest in the fast food category. Eighty-nine percent of the participants selected McDonald’s as 
the brand most representative of the fast food category. Forty-five undergraduate students 
participated in the pretest for the toothpaste category. Thirty-seven percent of them rated Crest 
the most typical (4) and 34% rated Colgate the most typical (4). However, we chose Colgate as 
the scandalized brand due to concern over the manipulation of brand relatedness.  
To summarize, as a result of pretest 1, we used Nike as the scandalized brand in the sports 
shoe category; we used McDonald’s as the scandalized brand in the fast food category; and we 
used Colgate as the scandalized brand in the toothpaste category.  
4.1.2 Pretest 2 
The purpose of the second pretest was to explore the brand relatedness of the scandalized 
brand and its close competing brands. We looked for two pairs of brands in the sports shoe 
category: one with a high level of brand relatedness, another with a low level of brand 
relatedness. For the toothpaste category, we tested the manipulation of brand relatedness between 
the scandalized brand and its competing brand.  
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Pretest 2a 
A total of 74 Chinese undergraduate students (different from the ones of pretest 1) 
participated in pretest 2a. This pretest used a computer-based response time sequential priming 
method to collect data. This method is commonly used to measure response latency, an indicator 
of the strength of an association between two brands. Research in both social psychology and 
consumer research have used response latency to measure the strength of associations in a 
variety of contexts, such as between products and brands (Herr, et al., 1996), between nodes and 
brand (Till, Baack, & Waterman, 2011), between two sub-brands, or between a parent brand and 
a sub-brand (Lei, et al., 2008).  
E-Prime was the software used to conduct this pretest. To determine brand relatedness 
between the scandalized brand and the competing brand, the participants were first exposed to 
the scandalized brand, for instance, McDonald’s, for 750 milliseconds (referred to as “stimulus 
onset asynchrony”). Then, the brand was replaced with one of the competing brands, such as 
KFC, Subway, Pizza Hut or Burger King. The participants were instructed to respond to the 
question of “relatedness” between the two brands by pressing, as quickly and accurately as 
possible, either the “M” key (yes) or the “Z” key (no). The reverse pattern of keys was used for 
left-handed participants. The order in which the competing brand and the scandalized brands 
were presented was randomized to reduce bias resulting from association chaining or order 
effects (Till, et al., 2011). We also put in some filler questions, which asked the brand relatedness 
between brands from two different categories. All of the questions were provided in a 
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randomized order as well. Only “yes” responses were analyzed, because the participants who 
answered the “relatedness” question with “no” may not have associated the scandalized brand 
with the competing brand. Response latency was measured by calculating the time the 
participants took to provide an answer. We eventually obtained the results of brand relatedness 
for several pairs of brands in the sports shoe category.  
Based on the value of brand relatedness and in consideration of the commonalities 
between the two brands, in the sports shoe category, we found that the brand relatedness between 
Nike and Adidas was high, while the brand relatedness between Nike and New Balance was low 
(MeanNew Balance=1059.6ms versus MeanAdidas=810.1ms; t75=3.41, p< .01). In the fast food 
category, the high brand relatedness pair was McDonald’s and KFC. The low brand relatedness 
pair was McDonald’s and Burger King (MeanBurger King=1118.6 ms versus MeanKFC=741.0 ms; 
t77=4.15, p< .001).  
Pretest 2b 
In the toothpaste category, as stated above, we used Colgate as the scandalized brand. 
Another toothpaste brand Darlie, a division of Hawley & Hazel Chemical Company, was used as 
the competing brand. The reason why only one competing brand is used in the toothpaste 
category is brand relatedness was manipulated in the main study. The main reason for this was 
that the Colgate-Palmolive Company had acquired the Hawley & Hazel Chemical Company in 
1985. However, this was not widely known to consumers because Darlie products had not been 
marketed through Colgate-Palmolive. We manipulated the brand relatedness between Colgate 
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and Darlie using this information. Forty-four students participated in the pretest for the 
toothpaste category. Half of the participants were informed that Colgate-Palmolive had acquired 
Hawley & Hazel in 1985 before being asked to rate the brand relatedness between the two 
companies. The remaining participants rated the brand relatedness without knowing about this 
relationship. In the pretest of the toothpaste category, we also used computer-assisted sequential 
priming to measure “brand relatedness”. However, we used a seven-point scale (1= “not strongly 
related”; 7= “strongly related”), instead of “yes” or “no” questions (Chapman & Aylesworth, 
1999). The other parts of the pretest in the toothpaste category were identical with the pretest for 
the fast food category and sports shoe category.  
The results verified the effectiveness of brand manipulation relatedness. The fact that 
Colgate-Palmolive had acquired the Hawley & Hazel Chemical Company, indeed, increased the 
brand relatedness between Colgate and Darlie (4.64 versus 5.64; t42=-2.24, p< .05). 
To sum up all of pretest 2, we used Colgate as the scandalized brand and Darlie as the 
competing brand in the toothpaste category. In the sports shoe category, Nike and Adidas had a 
high level of brand relatedness, while Nike and New Balance had a low level of brand 
relatedness. The high brand relatedness pair in the fast food category was McDonald’s and KFC. 
The low brand relatedness pair was McDonald’s and Burger King. 
4.1.3 Pretest 3   
The purpose of the third pretest was to verify the existence of spillover effect from a 
brand-harm crisis to other brands in the same product category. The students who participated in 
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the third pretest were divided into two groups. The first group shared their attitudes toward or 
beliefs about the competing brands (Darlie, KFC and New Balance). The other group of students 
rated questions about the second competing brand in each product category (Burger King and 
Adidas). The sample size of each group was around 30. The participants were different from 
those of pretests.  
Each participant examined the spillover effect from three brand-harm crisis scenarios to 
three (or two) competing brands (one scandal story and one competing brand in each product 
category). We used the fast food category, where the scandalized brand was McDonald’s, as an 
example. The brand-harm crisis of McDonald’s related to how McDonald’s processed food 
without undergoing the necessary procedures. First, the participants shared their brand attitudes 
toward and brand beliefs about KFC. These values became the benchmarks for negative spillover 
effect. The questions about brand attitude were anchored by a 7-point scale (“negative/positive,” 
“bad/good,” “unfavorable/favorable”) (Lei, et al., 2008). The belief questions were, “At times, 
KFC processes food without necessary procedures,” “KFC sometimes processes food without 
necessary procedures” and “KFC occasionally processes food without necessary procedures” (a 
7-point scale “disagree/agree”) (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). After one week, the participants read 
the scandal story containing the brand-harm crisis of McDonald’s in the second session. All of 
the participants, again, expressed their beliefs about and attitudes toward KFC. The scales were 
the same as those used in the first session.  
We measured the distances between the benchmark values and the new attitude or belief 
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values. Spillover occurs if the distance value becomes negative. Nike’s story was about how 
Nike treated Chinese consumers with a “double standard.” Colgate’s brand-harm crisis was that 
its toothpaste products contained Triclosan, which has been claimed to cause cancer. All brand 
crisis stories came from news happening in real world. The results from the t-test about the 
difference between pre-crisis and post crises were the following: Adidas (brand attitude: 5.08 vs. 
4.43, t29=2.62, p<0.05; brand belief: 3.56 vs.4.19, t29=-3.42, p <0.05), New Balance (brand 
attitude: 5.42 vs. 5.08, t36=2.45, p <0.01; brand belief: 4.23 vs.4.52, t38=-1.77, p <0.1), KFC 
(brand attitude: 4.48 vs. 4.19, t35=2.48, p <0.05; brand belief: 3.39 vs.4.61, t35=-5.35, p <0.001), 
Burger King (brand attitude: 4.56 vs. 4.06, t27=3.66, p <0.01; brand belief: 3.60 vs. 4.20, 
t28=-2.23, p <0.5) and Darlie (brand attitude: 4.38 vs. 4.12, t31=2.67, p <0.01; brand belief: 3.21 
vs. 3.67, t31=-1.33, p <0.5 ).  
4.2 Study 1 
The purpose of this study was to examine the main effects of both sensegiving and 
sensehiding denial messages. Given the purpose of the study, we chose compliance intention as 
the dependent variable (Kronrod, Grinstein, & Wathieu, 2012). Here, compliance intention refers 
to a consumer’s tendency to be persuaded by the denial message that the competing brand was 
not involved in the brand-harm crisis. We expected that there would be differential effects with 
respect to the two types of denial response messages, regardless of the level of brand relatedness.  
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   4.2.1 Sample and Design 
A 2 (denial response message: sensegiving vs. sensehiding) × 2 (brand relatedness: low vs. 
high) between-participants experimental design was conducted. One hundred and forty-seven 
students from a Chinese university participated in this study. 57.7% of the participants were 
female, with an average age of 25. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental groups.  
4.2.2 Experimental Stimuli 
Colgate was used as the scandalized brand based on the results of the pretests. Darlie was 
the competing brand. We used a newspaper report format about a product-harm crisis involving 
Colgate as the external information prime. Previous research had used this “newspaper like” 
method in a brand-harm crisis study (Ahluwalia, et al., 2000). By using such a method, the 
participants were exposed to a scenario in the form of a newspaper article and their reactions 
were measured by a questionnaire (Stammerjohan, Wood, Chang, & Thorson, 2005). The 
brand-harm crisis story had been tested in the pretest to ensure the existence of the negative 
spillover effect.  
4.2.3 Experimental Procedure 
The participants took part in the study by answering an online brand evaluation 
questionnaire, which was developed utilizing a Chinese survey website. First, all the participants 
were asked to measure the perceived severity, locus of attribution, ownership, and usage 
frequency, as these were the control variables. The perceived severity is defined as the severity of 
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the brand-harm crisis (Laufer, Gillespie, McBride & Gonzalez, 2005). The locus of attribution 
reflects the blame assignment (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). There was also a question about 
brand relatedness, for the purpose of checking manipulation (Lei, et al., 2008). After this, the 
participants were exposed to a crisis story about Colgate, followed by a question related to the 
perceived severity of the crisis. Participants were presented with the denial message from Darlie: 
either the sensegiving denial message or the sensehiding denial message. The sensegiving denial 
message began with “Our toothpaste products contain no Triclosan, and we would definitely not 
add this component to our product line.” The sensehiding message was “We have noticed this 
issue. We guarantee the safety of our products by following the updated regulations and recent 
research.” Then, the participants answered the questions related to the measures of compliance 
intention (Kronrod, et al., 2012). At the end, the participants provided demographic information. 
Please refer Appendix 1 as the stimulus story.  
4.2.4 Dependent Measure 
Compliance intention was the dependent variable in this experiment. We adapted four 
measurement items from previous research (Kronrod, et al., 2012). Following the exposure of the 
manipulated response message, the participants were instructed to answer the following 
questions with a seven-point scale: how plausible is the response that Darlie provides (1 = not at 
all plausible and 7 =very plausible); how certain is the response that Darlie provides (1 = not 
certain at all and 7 =very certain); how sure are you that you believe that the products of Darlie 
contain Triclosan (1 = not sure at all and 7 =quite sure); what is the chance that you will believe 
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that the products of Darlie contain Triclosan (1 = very low chance and 7 =very high chance) 
(Kronrod et al., 2012). A composite index of the four items on the scale was used in the analysis 
(α=0.84).  
4.2.5 Results 
Manipulation check. Seven-point scales were used to assess the control and manipulation 
check variables. Brand relatedness was evaluated for the manipulation check. An independent 
t-test revealed that the participants perceived higher brand relatedness between Colgate and 
Darlie when they were told the parent company of Darlie had been acquired by Colgate than 
when they were not (Mlow=1.89 vs. Mhigh=4.80; p< .001). The results of this independent t-test 
suggested that the brand relatedness manipulation was effective.  
Compliance intention. First, we hypothesized that the sensegiving message would reduce 
any negative spillover effect more than the sensehiding message would (H1). The results of 
one-way ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect for the denial response strategy. 
(Msensegiving=3.92 vs. Msensehiding=3.21; F(1, 147)=27.37; p<.001). Specifically, the compliance 
intention of the sensegiving denial message was significantly higher than it was for the 
sensehiding denial message. Therefore, H1 was supported.  
We further explored the two-way interaction between denial messages and brand relatedness 
as stated in the second hypothesis. When brand relatedness was high, the difference between the 
compliance intention of the sensehiding message and the sensehiding message was greater than it 
was with the low brand relatedness. The two-way interaction between the response strategy and 
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brand relatedness on reducing the spillover effect was statistically significant (F(3, 145)=9.087; 
p<.01). To further understand the direction of this two-way interaction, we conducted an 
additional analysis. The results showed that there was no significant difference in the participants’ 
responses to the two types of denial messages at the high level of brand relatedness (F(1, 73)=1.81; 
p>.10; Msensegiving=3.87 vs. Msensehiding= 3.60). However, we found a significant difference at the 
low level of brand relatedness, indicating that the sensegiving message was associated with 
greater compliance intention than the sensehiding response strategy was (F(1, 74)=12.48; p<.001; 
Msensegiving=3.99 vs. Msensehiding=2.89). These results conflict with the direction of the interaction 
stated in the second hypothesis, which will be explained later. Please refer to Table 1 and Figure 
1. 
Control variables. Apart from the independent and dependent variables, we also measured 
some key control variables, which included perceived severity (F=.03, p > .10), locus of 
attribution (F=.06, p>.10), ownership (F=.18, p >.10), and product usage (F=.867, p >.10). The 
results showed that these variables had no different effect on compliance intention across the 
four conditions. Such variables were removed from the following analysis. 
4.2.6 Discussion 
The first purpose of Study 1 was to examine the differential effects of the two types of 
denial message strategies on negative spillover to competing brands. A performance-based brand 
harm-crisis involving the product category of toothpaste was mimicked as a hypothetical 
scenario. In line with previous research (Kronrod et al., 2012), we chose compliance intention as 
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the dependent variable in this study. We found that the sensegiving message strategy was more 
effective than the sensehiding strategy in reducing negative spillover. These results are in 
accordance with what we hypothesized. Thus, Study 1 provided baseline evidence to support 
further exploration of denial response strategies.   
The second purpose of Study 1 was to explore the moderating role that brand relatedness 
plays in the consumers’ processing of a competitor’s denial response message. Specifically, we 
examined the interaction effect between brand relatedness and two types of denial response 
strategies on compliance intention. The results of this interaction effect were significant, 
indicating that brand relatedness could serve as a contingent condition to a response strategy’s 
effect on compliance intention. However, we hypothesized that the difference between the effects 
of the sensegiving and sensehiding strategies would tend to be greater when brand relatedness 
was high than when it was low, but this was not supported. On the contrary, the findings showed 
that when brand relatedness was low, the difference between the compliance intentions of the 
two strategies was greater than when brand relatedness was high. One possible explanation for 
this could be related to the dependent variable, compliance intention, which largely measures the 
consumers’ belief in the response message, not to capture the consumers’ attitudinal and 
behavioral reactions to the competing brand. Savings-in-relearning effect can be used to interpret 
the underlying mechanism of the opposite direction (Todorov & Uleman, 2003). Such effects 
suggested that individuals could link the results from encoding of a behavior description to the 
mental representation of the actor. Put such effect in this study, consumers code the message 
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based on the different framings of the negation. Sensegiving message, due to containing a 
negation tag, is highly likely to be perceived as denial, further connected with the competitor by 
consumers. Sensehiding message, on the other hand, describe the “innocent” behavior implicitly. 
When consumers answer the compliance intention about a specific behavior description (i.e. 
denial message), the saving-in-relearning of sensegiving message activates the spontaneous 
linkage between a denial message and the competitor. Comparing with the one of sensegiving 
message, the linkage between a denial message and the competitor is not strong, relatively. 
However, when brand relatedness is high, the association between scandalized brand and 
competing brand is strong enough for consumers to disconnect the “innocent” impression with 
competing brand, even after encoding of the behavior description. Alternatively, the level of 
brand relatedness might not have been interpreted in the way it was intended. For example, in the 
hypothetical example, individuals who were aware of a brand acquisition (i.e., a competing 
brand) by the Colgate company did not necessarily feel that the two brands were related to each 
other, or at least, their relatedness was not built on common features of the products (Lei et al., 
2008). In the following studies, these shortcomings were addressed by adding dependent 
variables and better controls over brand relatedness.  
The majority of research in the brand harm crisis literature has used consumer reaction to a 
brand as a dependent variable, for example, brand belief (Roehm & Tybout, 2006), brand attitude 
(Ahluwalia et al., 2000), and brand evaluation (Lei et al., 2008). Therefore, it made sense to 
gauge other dependent variables to see how the pattern of interaction effects might change. In the 
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next experimental study, we used a different product category with dependent variables 
presumed to be the most relevant to consumers’ attitudinal and behavioral responses to the 
competing brand.   
4.3 Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to further test the differential effects of sensegiving versus 
sensehiding denial messages (H1), and to determine how such effects interact with brand 
relatedness to reduce negative spillover to competing brands (H2). In this study, brand evaluation 
was used as the key dependent variable, in addition to the previous dependent variable of 
compliance intention.  
For the purpose of generalizability, a new product category, fast food, was used. To remedy 
the limitation on the brand relatedness manipulation from Study 1, in Study 2 we controlled the 
levels of brand relatedness using an improved method. Moreover, we added the new baseline 
condition of response strategy, which is similar to the silence strategy used by competitors 
(Roehm & Tybout, 2006). According to Roehm and Tybout, silence from a competitor can be a 
viable strategy for lessening negative spillover from a brand-harm crisis. Thus, we considered the 
silence strategy as a baseline for verifying the effects of the two response strategies that are 
central to our research interests.  
4.3.1 Participants and Design 
A 3 (denial response messages: sensegiving vs. sensehiding vs. silence) × 2 (brand 
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relatedness: low vs. high) between-subjects experimental design was conducted. Two hundred 
and seven different participants from a Chinese university were randomly assigned to one of the 
six experimental conditions. 49.8% of the participants were female and the average age of the 
participants was 26.  
4.3.2 Experimental Stimuli 
Based on the results of the pretests, McDonald’s was used as the scandalized brand. KFC 
had high brand relatedness with McDonald’s and Burger King had low brand relatedness. We 
used a news report of a product-harm crisis concerning McDonald’s as the external information 
prime. The brand crisis scenario had been assessed in the pretest to ensure the existence of 
negative spillover effect.  
4.3.3 Experimental Conditions and Manipulation 
Online questionnaires were also adopted for this experiment. Additionally, this study was 
conducted in two separate periods to improve the internal validity of the results. In the first week, 
all of the participants were asked to measure category familiarity and brand commitment with 
regard to the scandalized brand. Following that, the participants provided a brand evaluation of 
the scandalized brand, McDonald’s, and the two competing brands, KFC and Burger King. These 
measures served as pre-crisis baseline brand evaluations. One week later, these participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. They received the second questionnaire, which 
started with a crisis story about McDonald’s, followed by questions related to the perceived 
severity of the crisis, brand relatedness, ownership, and usage frequency. The crisis scenario was 
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manipulated as Appendix 2.  
Following the delivery of this message, the participants were presented with denial 
manipulations from one competing brand: a sensegiving denial message or a sensehiding denial 
message from either KFC or Burger King. Using KFC as an example, the sensegiving denial 
message was, “KFC has never and will never process food without following the necessary 
procedures.” The sensehiding message was, “KFC always provides consumers with quality food 
and cautious processing.” The participants then answered measurement questions regarding 
compliance intention and brand evaluation for the competing brand. Finally, the participants 
provided demographic information and were debriefed on the true purpose of the study.  
4.3.4 Dependent Measures 
We introduced a second dependent variable in this study, which measured change in the 
brand evaluation of the competing brand. Previous research had used the change of brand 
attitude, brand belief, or brand evaluation as the dependent variable in negative brand publicity 
research (Ahluwalia, et al., 2000; Puzakova, Kwak, & Rocereto, 2013) or in negative spillover 
studies (Lei, et al., 2008; Roehm & Tybout, 2006). We used brand evaluation as a dependent 
variable to explore the consumers’ response to the brand scandal and the competing brand’s 
response. The brand evaluation included a measurement with five dimensions on a seven-point 
scale: brand attitude (“good/bad,” “favorable/unfavorable,” “negative/positive”), brand trust 
(“not at all trustworthy/very trustworthy,” “not at all reliable/very reliable,” “not at all 
dependable/very dependable”), perceived quality (“low quality/high quality”), brand purchase 
  
 
61 
likelihood (“not at all likely/very likely”), and brand loyalty (“not at all satisfied/very satisfied,” 
“not at all likely to recommend/very likely to recommend”). All of the items were adapted from 
previous scales (Ahluwalia, et al., 2000; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Lei, et al., 2008) and were 
measured by seven-point semantic differential scales (e.g.: 1 =not good at all and 7 = very good). 
The reliability of these scales has been widely acknowledged (α=0.87). In the first week, the 
mean of the ten-item brand evaluation scale served as the baseline. In the second week, the mean 
of this composited brand evaluation measurement was computed as well. The difference between 
these two means served as the value of the second dependent variable. More specifically, the 
difference was calculated by subtracting the second brand evaluation mean from the baseline 
(Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Compliance intention was the initial dependent variable. The measures 
of this variable were the same as those described in Study 1.  
4.3.5 Results 
Manipulation check. A seven-point scale measured brand relatedness for the purpose of the 
manipulation check. As expected, there was a significant difference in the levels of brand 
relatedness (Mlow=4.24 vs. Mhigh=5.71; p<.001). Therefore, the manipulation was deemed 
successful.  
Compliance intention.  Firstly, we explored the compliance intention for the two kinds of 
response messages. We only examined four of the six conditions because compliance intention 
was not applicable to the silence strategy. We predicted that the spillover effect would be less 
pronounced when the sensegiving denial message was given, than when the sensehiding denial 
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message was given. In other words, the compliance intention of the sensegiving message was 
expected to be larger than the sensehiding message. The results of one-way ANOVA showed that 
the difference between the compliance intentions of the two kinds of response strategies was 
significant (Msensegiving=3.44, Msensehiding=2.97; F(1,134)=6.78; p<.05). Secondly, we explored the 
effect from a two-way interaction between the denial response strategy and brand relatedness on 
the compliance intention. The results of ANOVA showed that the difference between the 
compliance intention of the sensehiding message and the sensegiving message was significantly 
different when brand relatedness varied (F(3,132)=4.07; p<.05). Similar to the results of Study 1, 
the interaction effect on compliance intention did exist. Additional analysis was conducted to 
achieve a better understanding of the interaction effect.  
When brand relatedness is high, the difference in the compliance intention of the two kinds 
of response strategies should be greater than when brand relatedness is low. The results of simple 
effect revealed that only low brand relatedness interacted with the two kinds of response 
strategies (Msensegiving=3.57, Msensehiding=2.73; F(1, 65)=10.79; p<.05), while high brand relatedness 
did not (Msensegiving=3.31, Msensehiding=3.19; F(1,67)=.213; p>.10). Thus, the pattern of the 
interaction was the same as observed in Study 1, contrary to what we had expected in H1. Please 
refer to Table 2 and Figure 2. 
Brand evaluation.  Given the contradictory finding above, we looked into changes in brand 
evaluation as the second dependent variable. More specifically, we compared the brand 
evaluation of the competing brand before and after the scandal story. The differential score 
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served as the value of the dependent variable. For the first hypothesis, we predicted that the 
sensegiving strategy would reduce negative spillover effect more than the sensehiding strategy. 
The results of one-way ANOVA showed that when the sensegiving strategy was used, the 
difference was less than when the sensehiding strategy was used (Msensegiving=.12, Msensehiding=-.25， 
Msilence=-.26; F(2,206)=3.29; p<.05). H1 was therefore supported. Turning to the second hypothesis, 
which referred to the interaction effect involving brand relatedness and response strategies on 
changes in brand evaluation, the results of an ANOVA revealed that such an effect was 
statistically significant (F(5,201)=2.67; p=.07<.10). Thus, H2 was also supported. In addition, a one 
sample t-test showed that two of the three pairs of response strategies were significantly different 
from each other, as brand evaluation changed when brand relatedness was high (Msensegiving 
=-0.09, Msensehiding =-.79; F(1, 68)=2.06; p<.01; Msensegiving =-0.09, Msilence=-.66; F(1,69)=1.16; p<.01). 
The exception to this was the results of sensehiding strategy and silence strategy, which were not 
significantly different when brand relatedness was high (Msensehiding =-.79, Msilence=-.66; 
F(1,68)=.55; p>.10). The three response strategies were not statistically different from each other 
when brand relatedness was low (Msensegiving =.32, Msensehiding =.33, Msilence=.15; F(2,99)=.51; p>.1). 
The results suggest that the pattern of the interaction effect was in line with our hypothesis. H2 
was supported. Please refer to Table 3 and Figure 3 for details. 
Controls Perceived severity, category familiarity, brand commitment toward scandalized 
brand, locus of attribution, ownership, and usage frequency were controlled in Study 2 because 
of their potential confounding effects on the dependent variable. The results from an ANOVA 
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indicated that these variables had no significant influence on the dependent variables we were 
interested in. (Perceived severity (F(1,200)=.20; p>.10), category familiarity (F(1,200)=.20; p>.10), 
brand commitment towards scandalized brand (F(1,200)=1.10; p>.10), ownership (F(1,200)=.77; 
p>.10), and usage frequency (F(1,200)=1.01; p>.10). 
4.3.6 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 was to further validate the hypothesized effects of different types of 
denial response messages on negative spillover. Similar to the findings of Study 1, the 
sensegiving strategy received better compliance than the sensehiding strategy. Meanwhile, brand 
relatedness did interact with response strategy on compliance intention, with the expected 
direction as hypothesized.   
As far as the dependent variable, brand evaluation, was concerned, both H1 and H2 were 
fully supported by the findings in Study 2. The change in brand evaluation was smaller when a 
sensegiving denial strategy was provided, compared to when a sensehiding denial strategy was 
provided. These results are in line with what we expected in H1. A significant interaction effect 
between brand relatedness and response strategy was also observed, consistent with H2. More 
importantly, the three types of response strategies had significantly differential effects on brand 
evaluation only when brand relatedness was high. Specifically, the sensegiving strategy differed 
from the other two strategies while the sensehiding strategy and silence strategy did not differ 
from each other statistically. Moreover, when brand relatedness was low, there was no difference 
in effect on change in brand evaluation. Therefore, the level of brand relatedness appeared to 
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play a critical role in understanding the effectiveness of denial message strategies for reducing 
negative spillover.  
In Study 3. We further aimed to examine consumers’ reaction after being exposed to a brand 
crisis and a particular denial response message. In addition, we introduced a new experimental 
factor related to individual thinking styles. Previous studies have indicated that analytical and 
holistic thinkers tend to respond differently to brand harm crisis (Monga & John, 2008). As 
shown in our third hypothesis, we expected the interaction effect between denial response 
messages and brand relatedness (H2) would tend to vary with individual thinking styles. Here a 
three-way interaction was expected (H3). Therefore, Study 3 was designed to explore the 
hypothesized three-way interaction effect, and in so doing, provide further evidence with regard 
to the results reported earlier. Given the focus of individual thinking styles and the need for 
generalizability, we used a different kind of brand harm crisis scenario. Specifically, apart from 
the performance-based brand harm crisis, previous research had identified what has been 
described as a value-based crisis, referring to scandals, unethical conduct and public disclosures 
(Dutta & Pullig, 2011). In addition, the results of Study 2 show that there are no statistically 
significant differences between sensehiding and silence strategies in both levels of brand 
relatedness. When brand relatedness is low, there are no different effect from sensegiving 
strategy and silence strategy on consumers’ reaction either. In this following study, we wanted to 
further examine the comparison among sensegiving, sensehiding, and silence strategy to get a 
better understating about the silence strategy. 
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4.4 Study 3  
In the marketplace, only two types of brand crises have been studied in previous research 
(Dutta & Pullig, 2011). Thus, there was an important need to address whether our arguments 
could be extended to a different crisis context. In this experimental design, the brand-harm crisis 
scenario was changed to further this objective. The product category, sports shoes, was used for 
this study. Similar to Study 2, we manipulated the denial response messages and controlled for 
levels of brand relatedness between the scandalized brand and the competing brand. Individual 
thinking styles were measured by following previous research (I. Choi, et al., 2007). Meanwhile, 
we continued to use silence strategy as the baseline for this study. 
4.4.1 Sample and Design 
A 3 (sensegiving vs. sensehiding vs. silence) × 2 (brand relatedness: low vs. high) × 2 
(thinking style: holistic vs. analytic) design was used to test our predictions. A sample of 244 
participants was recruited for the study. 48% of the participants were female and the average of 
the age was 25. Both denial message and brand relatedness are manipulated and the thinking 
style is measured.   
4.4.2 Experimental Stimuli 
In this study, Nike was the scandalized brand. Based on our pretests, Adidas was the 
competing brand with high brand relatedness and New Balance was the competing brand with 
low brand relatedness. The brand-harm crisis of Nike was that Nike misled consumers about the 
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technology used in its shoes. A “newspaper like” story was also created for this study and had 
been tested in the pretest for its spillover effect.  
4.4.3 Experimental Conditions and Manipulation 
As in Study 2, the dependent variable, change in brand evaluation, was measured in two 
separate periods, one week apart. In the first week, all of the participants were asked about 
category familiarity. They were then asked to provide brand evaluations for brands in the sports 
shoe category. The brand evaluations in the first week served as the baseline for measuring the 
change in brand evaluation after the participants had been exposed to the brand-harm crisis one 
week later.  
In the second week, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions. They then read a story about Nike’s brand-harm crisis, which was described as the 
Appendix 3.  
After reading the story, the participants read an article, containing a denial response 
message (sensegiving or sensehiding) from either Adidas or New Balance. In the case of Adidas, 
the sensegiving message was, “Adidas has never misled consumers about the technology used in 
our products”. In contrast, the sensehiding message was, “Adidas will always be honest with our 
consumers”. Participants then provided their brand evaluation of the competing brand by using 
the same scale they used in the first week. Later, a ten-item scale was used to identify the 
analytic and holistic thinkers (I. Choi, et al., 2007). The scale asked the participants to agree or 
disagree (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) with ten measurement items. The detailed list of 
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the items was provided in Appendix 1. We followed the method used by Choi, et al. (2003) to 
differentiate analytic thinkers from holistic thinkers. Finally, the participants reported their 
demographic information and were debriefed with regard to the true purpose of the study.  
4.4.4 Dependent Measures 
Brand evaluations.  The items pertaining to changes in brand evaluations were the same as 
in the previous studies (α=0.92).  
4.4.5 Results 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check was similar to Study 2.  
Brand evaluation. Firstly, the results of one-way ANOVA showed that the sensegiving 
response alleviated more negative spillover effect than the other response strategies. In other 
words, changes in the brand evaluations of the competing brands were less when the sensegiving 
message was given (Msensegiving=-.47, Msensehiding=-.77, Msilence=-.80, F(2, 238)=2.35, p<.10). Thus, 
H1 was supported. Parenthetically, the interaction effect between brand relatedness and response 
strategy did impact change in brand evaluation (F(5, 238)=2.95, p<.10). More specifically, when 
brand relatedness was high, the differential effect of the sensegiving response and sensehiding 
response was greater. Further analysis showed that the pattern of interaction accorded with the 
expected direction. When brand relatedness was high, the two message strategies demonstrated 
significant impact on the change in brand evaluations (Msensegiving=-.51, Msensehiding=-1.18, F(2, 
81)=3.38, p<.01; Msensegiving=-.51, Msilence=-1.11, F(2, 80)=2.98, p<.01). Similar to what was 
observed in Study 2, there was no significant difference in the effectiveness of denial response 
  
 
69 
messages at a low level of brand relatedness (Msensegiving=-.43, Msensehiding=-.35, Msilence=-.48, F(2, 
120)=.18, p>.10). Therefore, H2 was also supported. Please refer to Table 4 and Figure 4. We 
additionally looked into the three-way interaction effects. We identified analytic and holistic 
thinkers by using a media split (Contradiction domain: median= 4.6; Locus of attention domain: 
median=5.6) (Monga & John, 2008). The results indicated that individual thinking styles did not 
interact with the other two variables, brand relatedness and response message strategies, 
regardless of the levels of brand relatedness (Locus of attention domain: F(5, 115)=1.94, p>.10; 
Contradiction domain: F(5, 117)=.21, p>.10). As a result, H3 was not supported.  
4.4.6 Discussion 
In this study, we continued to explore the first two hypotheses. In addition, we added the 
third hypothesis and used a different scenario (value-based brand harm crisis).  
The findings related to the first two hypotheses were similar to the previous two studies. 
When the sensegiving strategy was applied, the change in brand evaluation was less than when 
the sensehiding strategy was applied, indicating that the sensegiving strategy may have reduced a 
negative spillover more than the sensehiding strategy did. When the competing brand had a low 
level of brand relatedness with a scandalized brand, the change in brand evaluation was less than 
when the sensehiding strategy was applied. When brand relatedness between the scandalized 
brand and the competing brand was high, the sensegiving strategy resulted in the greatest 
reduction in negative spillover effect.  
We did not achieve significant results with regard to the third hypothesis when brand 
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evaluation was the dependent variable. In other words, thinking style did not interact with brand 
relatedness and response strategy on brand evaluation.   
In summary, we used two dependent variables: compliance intention and brand evaluation 
in this study. We tested all three hypotheses that covered the main effects from two different 
kinds of response strategies, the two-way interaction between response strategies and brand 
relatedness and the three-way interaction between response strategies, brand relatedness, and 
thinking styles. This study provided more support for the first two hypotheses, but failed to 
support the third hypotheses.  
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Spillover from a brand crisis happens quite often in the marketplace. The harm that a brand 
crisis brings is not limited to the scandalized brand. Other brands, such as sub-brands, parent 
brands, or competing brands, may also be affected. This study focused on negative spillover 
effect from the perspective of competing brands. In fact, when marketers of competing brands 
face negative spillover effect, the first question they ask is whether they need to respond to a 
brand crisis. Previous research has suggested that competing brands should provide a denial 
message, rather than keeping silent (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). However, the denial response 
suggested by previous research may not be the only response message that a competing company 
can use. The objective of this research was to explore a denial response with the aim of reducing 
any negative spillover effect from another brands’ crisis. We introduced the concept of “sense” 
and defined two kinds of denial messages based on the framing of the denial sense in each 
strategy. The sensegiving strategy referred to a denial message containing negation to deliver a 
denial sense. The sensehiding strategy referred to a denial message using affirmation to deliver 
the denial sense. In addition to this, we examined how brand relatedness interacted with these 
two denial messages in terms of consumer response and the interaction between brand 
relatedness, response strategies, and thinking styles.  
Across three studies are explored these relationships. Specifically, we manipulated two 
forms of denial in all three studies and the levels of brand relatedness in two out of three studies 
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(Study 2 and Study 3), while individual thinking styles were introduced in the third study. 
Moreover, we included the silence response strategy in Studies 2 and 3 so that we could explore 
the baseline condition (i.e. silence) in the context of our study. The silence strategy may provide 
a better explanation of the effects from the two forms of denial strategy.  
For dependent variables, we used compliance intention related to the denial message 
directly in the first study. In the second study, in addition to the compliance intention, we 
compared prior-crisis and post-denial response brand evaluations from competing brands. Such 
comparisons allowed us to access information beyond consumer reaction to the denial message. 
For the third study, we extended the generality of the first two predictions by using a different 
product category.   
Findings from the three studies showed that the sensegiving response strategy received 
more compliance intention and reduced more negative spillover than the sensehiding response 
strategy did. For the two-way interaction, brand relatedness did interact with denial messages on 
both compliance intention, and brand evaluation. However, due to the focus on compliance 
intention, the direction of the interaction was contrary to the second hypothesis. Conversely, the 
change in brand evaluation was affected by the two-way interaction between response messages 
and brand relatedness in accord with the direction of H2. The underlying mechanism may be 
explained by the observation that when brand relatedness is high, spillover from the scandalized 
brand’s crisis is relatively greater, causing brand evaluation to change in a negative direction. 
The negation that the sensegiving strategy contains may provide a “not guilty” sense to 
  
 
73 
consumers. Such a sense may help the competing brand distance itself from the brand crisis, and 
the change in brand evaluation may be less than when the sensehiding strategy and silence 
strategy are applied. Meanwhile, high brand relatedness (i.e. a strong association between the 
scandalized brand and competing brand) may buffer the effects from either the sensehiding 
strategy or the silence strategy. The affirmation that the sensehiding strategy contains does not 
provide the strong denial sense that consumers need to reduce spillover. Moreover, affirmation 
may cause a boomerang effect, indicating that consumers may connect the scandalized brand 
with the competing brand to form an even stronger association. Keeping silent may reduce 
negative spillover more than the sensehiding strategy does when brand relatedness is high. With 
regard to low brand relatedness, the three kinds of response strategies did not have significantly 
different effects on the change in brand evaluation. Therefore, we concluded that when brand 
relatedness was high, the different effects of sensegiving versus sensehiding were greater than 
when brand relatedness was low.   
5.1 Theoretical Implications  
This research extends the literature in the areas of brand-harm crisis, sensemaking, and 
brand relatedness. The implications discussed in this section address the research questions 
presented at the beginning of this paper.  
The first contribution of this research is its investigation of denial message strategies from 
the competitor’s perspective. Based on the supportive results we received from the data, we 
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adopted a pair of concepts, sensegiving and sensehiding, as denial response strategies 
competitors can use following another brand’s crises. The existing brand-harm crisis literature 
from the competitor’s perspective is very limited. There has been, in fact, only one study 
exploring the importance of response strategies utilized by competitors (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). 
Thus, the introduction of these two types of denial message strategies brings insight to research 
on competitors’ response strategies.  
Second, this research extends the concept of sensemaking. Given the different and 
theoretically sound messages surrounding sensemaking, we explored sensegiving and 
sensehiding by characterizing this pair of concepts as competitors’ denial message strategies. 
Most of the previous studies about sensegiving and sensehiding have focused on strategic or 
organizational research problems (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Mahapatra & Pattnaik, 2013). 
There are indeed articles that have used the sensegiving concept to examine consumers’ attitudes 
or purchasing behavior, marketing channels, or other research (Woodside, 2001). However, there 
has been very little marketing literature on the concept of sensehiding. Both sensegiving and 
sensehiding concepts have previously not been found in brand-harm crisis research. Therefore, 
the results of this research shed new light on the concepts of sensehiding and sensegiving from a 
marketing perspective.   
Third, this study builds on established literature pertaining to associative network theory. 
Previous research has used this theory to analyze negative spillover effect within the same brand 
portfolio (Lei et al., 2008), rather than spillover from a scandalized brand to its competitors. We 
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adopted this theory to explore how spillover occurs from a scandalized brand to a competing 
brand. This contribution should advance the literature on associative network theory from a 
competitor’s perspective. 
With regard to the second research question, the theoretical implication this research has 
identified is that contingencies may influence the impact of denial response strategies on 
reducing a negative spillover effect. Notably, the conceptual model has provided a means to 
investigate the contingency role of two variables: (1) brand relatedness, representing the strength 
of the association between two brands (Lei et al., 2008); and (2) individual thinking styles 
(holistic or analytic), referred to as an individual’s cognitive processes that are promoted by their 
social environment (Nisbett et al., 2001). Compared to the findings from previous research, when 
brand relatedness is low, the effects from a sensegiving denial strategy and a silence strategy do 
not significantly differ from to each other (Tybout and Roehm, 2006). The identification (or the 
exploration) of these contingencies has created a better understanding of when and how to use an 
effective denial strategy.  
Last but not least, we not only compared a sensegiving strategy with a sensehiding strategy 
in the studies, but we also adopted the silence strategy as a baseline. Such a method may advance 
the competitor’s denial message strategy literature by bringing together all of the strategies that 
have been studied in previous research (Roehm & Tybout, 2006).  
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5.2 Managerial Implications 
This study also provides a practical guide for managers and marketers following another 
brand’s crisis. Referring to the questions asked in the problem identification section (“Which 
form of denial response can persuade consumers to believe in the innocence of a competing 
brand?” and “Do different forms of denial response have different impacts on reducing a 
negative spillover effect?”), our research shows that, compared to the sensehiding strategy and 
the silence strategy, the sensegiving strategy may reduce compliance intention, and alleviate 
negative brand evaluation brought by a brand-harm crisis. This finding may help marketers select 
the most suitable strategy in response to another brand’s crisis. We also discussed the framing 
that the two messages contain. More specially, we established a clear and simple criterion, 
negation, to differentiate the two types of response messages. Hence, marketers of competing 
companies should be able to determine both the intention they should deliver and the wording 
they should use in different response messages. With such clarification, top managers should be 
able to match the response with the sense and both frontline employees and executives should be 
able to understand the response strategy when consumers ask about their competitor’s 
involvement in a brand crisis.  
Second, this study discusses what marketers should be concerned with when they choose 
the response message. Similar to prior research, we have suggested that competitors should 
regard the relationship between the scandalized brand and the competing brand as the main 
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factor for deciding what the response message should be. Additionally, we use brand relatedness 
to represent a higher-order construct of brand similarity (Herr, 1989; Herr et al., 1996), which 
has rarely been addressed in the context of negative brand spillover research. Such a concept 
may help managers of competing brands to develop greater awareness of the conditions 
necessary to differentiate denial response strategies. Thus, this study contributes practically to 
the marketplace because a proper response message can avoid unexpected outcomes while still 
encouraging a positive evaluation of competing brands. For example, when a brand with high 
brand relatedness has a brand-harm crisis, marketers of competing brands could respond with a 
negation to differentiate the competing brand from the scandalized brand. In this case, a 
sensehiding strategy, emphasizing how good the competing brand is, may not work as well as a 
silence strategy. Hence, if a competitor cannot use a sensegiving strategy, the second best choice 
could be keeping silent rather than using a sensehiding strategy. Conversely, when a brand with 
low brand relatedness has a brand-harm crisis, a competitor could consider using a sensehiding 
strategy as an alternative to a sensegiving strategy to answer the doubts or questions from 
consumers or press, given the slight differences between the two strategies and the advantage of 
avoiding a boomerang effect.    
5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Like other studies, this study also has a few limitations, which indicate some avenues for 
further research.   
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First, this research examines one personal characteristics variable, thinking style. The 
insignificant results of the three-way interaction may have been caused by the experiment’s 
method because we measured thinking style rather than manipulated it. Holistic thinking and 
analytic thinking may not differ enough from each other to build a significant three-way 
interaction. Moreover, the unsupportive results may indicate the existence of other characteristics 
of individuals. Previous research has used variables such as gender (Laufer & Gillespie, 2004) to 
study brand crisis. Future research could adopt more or other individual characteristic variables 
and build them into the model.  
Second, the competing brands used in the three studies all have relatively high market share 
compared to other brands in the same product category. As one of the important features of a 
brand, market share may play an important role during the brand evaluation process or brand 
choice procedure. Thus, future research might consider using competing brands with lower 
market share to explore the role of market share.    
Third, there are some methodological constraints in this research. All of the studies used 
students as participants. Even though student samples are widely used in studies of consumer 
behavior, recent studies have nonetheless pointed to the downside of using student samples. 
Further studies could consider using Amazon Mechanical Turk to get a more representative 
sample. In terms of further constraints, there was one week between the Time 1 study and Time 2 
study. This interval could have affected the rate of participation and the research results. Further 
research could consider using a filler task to reduce the probability of excessive attention focused 
  
 
79 
on the scandalized brand instead of one week interval.  
Fourth, the brands we used in the three studies were all real brands. Though there may be an 
advantage to brand familiarity, knowing a brand may cause a problem with external validity. In 
future studies, researchers could consider using fictitious brands in their experiments.  
Finally, researchers may be interested in using brand switching as the third dependent 
variable. One brand’s crisis may become another brand’s opportunity (Cleeren, van Heerde, & 
Dekimpe, 2013). Hence, switching behaviour (or the preference strength) may provide some 
insight into how competing brands can use negative spillover effect to get positive results. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This research examines how marketers of one brand should respond to another brand’s 
crisis by introducing the concept of sensegiving vs. sensehiding denial response strategy. With 
different message framings of the denial sense, we differentiate between sensegiving and 
sensehiding. Through three experimental designs, we demonstrate that sensegiving response 
strategy reduces negative spillover more than sensehiding does. Furthermore, we explore the 
contingent condition of brand relatedness, and find that high brand relatedness is associated with 
a greater impact with respect to consumers’ responses to the two types of denial strategies. 
However, individual thinking styles, either analytic or holistic thinkers, have no significant 
impact on how consumers response to the denial strategies. These findings extend the 
brand-harm crisis literature and provide useful guidance for marketers developing more effective 
denial response strategies.   
 
  
  
 
81 
REFERENCES 
Aaker, D. A., & Joachimsthaler, E. (2000). The brand relationship spectrum. California 
Management Review, 42(4), 8-23.  
Aaker, D. A., & Keller, K. L. (1990). Consumer evaluations of brand extensions. Journal of 
Marketing, 54(1), 27-41.  
Ahearne, M., Gruen, T., & Saxton, M. K. (2000). When the product is complex, does the 
advertisement's conclusion matter? Journal of Business Research, 48(1), 55-62.  
Ahluwalia, R. (2002). How prevalent is the negativity effect in consumer environments? Journal 
of consumer research, 29(2), 270-279.  
Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, R. E., & Unnava, H. R. (2000). Consumer response to negative 
publicity: The moderating role of commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 
203-214.  
Ahluwalia, R., Unnava, H. R., & Burnkrant, R. E. (2001). The moderating role of commitment 
on the spillover effect of marketing communications. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(4), 
458-470.  
Ashforth, B. E., Harrison, S. H., & Corley, K. G. (2008). Identification in organizations: An 
examination of four fundamental questions. Journal of Management, 34(3), 325-374.  
Balachander, S., & Ghose, S. (2003). Reciprocal spillover effects: A strategic benefit of brand 
extensions. Journal of Marketing, 67(1), 4-13.  
Barr, P. S. (1998). Adapting to unfamiliar environmental events: A look at the evolution of 
interpretation and its role in strategic change. Organization Science, 9(6), 644-669.  
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview 
and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611-639.  
Bhattacharya, C. B., & Sen, S. (2003). Consumer-company identification: A framework for 
understanding consumers’ relationships with companies. Journal of Marketing, 67(2), 
76-88.  
Broniarczyk, S. M., & Alba, J. W. (1994). The importance of the brand in brand extension. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 31(2), 214-228.  
Chan, P. W., Johansen, E., & Moor, R. (2011). Developing interactions, disentangling 
contradictions: examining paradoxes of inter-organisational relations in constructing 
collaborations. Paper presented at the Management and Innovation for a Sustainable Built 
Environment MISBE 2011, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 20-23, 2011. 
Chapman, K. J., & Aylesworth, A. (1999). Riding the coat-tails of a positive review: rave reviews 
and attitude transfer. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 16(5), 418-440.  
Chen, Y., Ganesan, S., & Liu, Y. (2009). Does a firm's product-recall strategy affect its financial 
value? An examination of strategic alternatives during product-harm crises. Journal of 
Marketing, 73(6), 214-226.  
  
 
82 
Choi, I., Koo, M., & Choi, J. A. (2007). Individual differences in analytic versus holistic thinking. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(5), 691-705.  
Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). Situational salience and cultural differences in the 
correspondence bias and actor-observer bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
24(9), 949-960 
Chua, H. F., Boland, J. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (2005). Cultural variation in eye movements during 
scene perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 102(35), 12629-12633.  
Cleeren, K., van Heerde, H. J., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2013). Rising from the ashes: How brands 
and categories can overcome product-harm crises. Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 58-77.  
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing. 
Psychological Review, 82(6), 407-428.  
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis: An 
experimental study in crisis communication. Journal of public relations research, 8(4), 
279-295. 
Commbs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2008). Comparing apology to equivalent crisis response 
strategies: Clarifying apology’s role and value in crisis communication. Public Relations 
Review, 34(3), 252-257.  
Coombs, W. T. (2007a). Attribution theory as a guide for post-crisis communication research. 
Public Relations Review, 33(2), 135-139.  
Coombs, W. T. (2007b). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and 
application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 
163-176.  
Dahlen, M., & Lange, F. (2006). A disaster is contagious: How a brand in crisis affects other 
brands. Journal of Advertising Research, 46(4), 388-397.  
Darke, P. R., Ashworth, L., & Main, K. J. (2010). Great expectations and broken promises: 
Misleading claims, product failure, expectancy disconfirmation and consumer distrust. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(3), 347-362.  
Darke, P. R., Ashworth, L., & Ritchie, R. J. (2008). Damage from corrective advertising: Causes 
and cures. Journal of Marketing, 72(6), 81-97.  
Dawar, N., & Lei, J. (2009). Brand crises: The roles of brand familiarity and crisis relevance in 
determining the impact on brand evaluations. Journal of Business Research, 62(4), 509-516.  
Dawar, N., & Pillutla, M. M. (2000). Impact of product-harm crises on brand equity: The 
moderating role of consumer expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 215-226.  
De Mello, G., MacInnis, D. J., & Stewart, D. W. (2007). Threats to hope: effects on reasoning 
about product information. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(2), 153-161.  
Dean, D. H. (2004). Consumer reaction to negative publicity effects of corporate reputation, 
response, and responsibility for a crisis event. Journal of Business Communication, 41(2), 
192-211.  
Desai, K. K., & Keller, K. L. (2002). The effects of ingredient branding strategies on host brand 
  
 
83 
extendibility. Journal of Marketing, 66(1), 73-93.  
Dutta, S., & Pullig, C. (2011). Effectiveness of corporate responses to brand crises: The role of 
crisis type and response strategies. Journal of Business Research, 64(12), 1281-1287.  
Dyer, R. F., & Kuehl, P. G. (1978). A longitudinal study of corrective advertising. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 15(1), 39-48.  
Evans, J. S. B., Clibbens, J., & Rood, B. (1996). The role of implicit and explicit negation in 
conditional reasoning bias. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(3), 392-409.  
Farquhar, P. H., & Herr, P. M. (1993). The dual structure of brand associations. In Brand equity 
& advertising: Advertising's role in building strong brands (263-277), Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fazio, R. H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview. 
Cognition & Emotion, 15(2), 115-141.  
Feldman, J. M., & Lynch, J. G. (1988). Self-generated validity and other effects of measurement 
on belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73(3), 421-435.  
Fiedler, K., Walther, E., Armbruster, T., Fay, D., & Naumann, U. (1996). Do YouReallyKnow 
what you have seen? intrusion errors and presuppositions effects on constructive memory. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32(5), 484-511.  
Fisher, R. A. (1935). The design of experiments. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 
Fiske, S. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and 
extreme behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(6), 889-906.  
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2006). The symbolic management of strategic change: Sensegiving via 
framing and decoupling. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1173-1193.  
Ford, D., Gadde, L., Hakansson, H., & Snehota, I. (2003). Managing business networks: 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Gannon, K. M., & Ostrom, T. M. (1996). How meaning is given to rating scales: The effects of 
response language on category activation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32(4), 
337-360.  
Gilbert, D. T., Tafarodi, R. W., & Malone, P. S. (1993). You can't not believe everything you read. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(2), 221-233.  
Gioia, D. A., & Chittipeddi, K. (1991). Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change 
initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12(6), 433-448.  
Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., Moldovan, S., & Muller, E. (2007). The NPV of bad news. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24(3), 186-200.  
Grant, S. J., Malaviya, P., & Sternthal, B. (2004). The influence of negation on product 
evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(3), 583-591{Brown, 1979 #1972}.  
Greyser, S. A. (2009). Corporate brand reputation and brand crisis management. Management 
Decision, 47(4), 590-602.  
Hasson, U., & Glucksberg, S. (2006). Does understanding negation entail affirmation?: An 
examination of negated metaphors. Journal of Pragmatics, 38(7), 1015-1032.  
  
 
84 
Herr, P. M. (1989). Priming price: prior knowledge and context effects. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 16(1), 67-75.  
Herr, P. M., Farquhar, P. H., & Fazio, R. H. (1996). Impact of dominance and relatedness on 
brand extensions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5(2), 135-159.  
Hicks, C. R., & Turner, K. V. (1999). Fundamental concepts in the design of experiments (Vol. 
40): Oxford University Press New York. 
Hunt, S. A., Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (1994). Identity fields: Framing processes and the 
social construction of movement identities. New Social Movements: From ideology to 
identity, 185-208.  
Jacoby, J., Nelson, M. C., & Hoyer, W. D. (1982). Corrective advertising and affirmative 
disclosure statements: their potential for confusing and misleading the consumer. The 
Journal of Marketing, 46(1), 61-72.  
Janakiraman, R., Sismeiro, C., & Dutta, S. (2009). Perception spillovers across competing brands: 
a disaggregate model of how and when. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(4), 467-481.  
Ji, L.-J., Nisbett, R. E., & Su, Y. (2001). Culture, change, and prediction. Psychological Science, 
12(6), 450-456.  
Ji, L.-J., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture, control, and perception of relationships in 
the environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 943.  
Johar, G. V. (1996). Intended and unintended effects of corrective advertising on beliefs and 
evaluations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 5(3), 209-230.  
John, D. R., Loken, B., & Joiner, C. (1998). The negative impact of extensions: can flagship 
products be diluted? Journal of Marketing, 62(1), 19-32.  
Just, M. A., & Carpenter, P. A. (1976). Eye fixations and cognitive processes. Cognitive 
Psychology, 8(4), 441-480.  
Keller, K. L. (1993). Conceptualizing, measuring, and managing customer-based brand equity. 
Journal of Marketing, 57(1), 1-22.  
Kronrod, A., Grinstein, A., & Wathieu, L. (2012). Go green! Should environmental messages be 
so assertive? Journal of Marketing, 76(1), 95-102.  
Laufer, D., & Gillespie, K. (2004). Differences in consumer attributions of blame between men 
and women: The role of perceived vulnerability and empathic concern. Psychology & 
Marketing, 21(2), 141-157.  
Laufer, D., Gillespie, K., McBride, B., & Gonzalez, S. (2005). The role of severity in consumer 
attributions of blame: Defensive attributions in product-harm crises in Mexico. Journal of 
International Consumer Marketing, 17(2-3), 33-50. 
Laufer, D., Silvera, D. H., & Meyer, T. (2005). Exploring differences between older and younger 
consumers in attributions of blame for product harm crises. Academy of Marketing Science 
Review, 7(1), 1-13.  
Lei, J., Dawar, N., & Lemmink, J. (2008). Negative spillover in brand portfolios: exploring the 
antecedents of asymmetric effects. Journal of Marketing, 72(3), 111-123.  
  
 
85 
Levin, I. P., & Gaeth, G. J. (1988). How consumers are affected by the framing of attribute 
information before and after consuming the product. Journal of consumer research, 15(3), 
374-378.  
Loken, B., & Ward, J. (1990). Alternative approaches to understanding the determinants of 
typicality. Journal of Consumer Research, 17(2), 111-126.  
MacInnis, D. J., & De Mello, G. E. (2005). The concept of hope and its relevance to product 
evaluation and choice. Journal of Marketing, 69(1), 1-14.  
Mahapatra, P., & Pattnaik, S. (2013). Analyzing Organizational Change: A Sensemaking 
Perspective.  
Maheswaran, D., & Meyers-Levy, J. (1990). The influence of message framing and issue 
involvement. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(3), 361-367.  
Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending holistically versus analytically: comparing the 
context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(5), 922-934.  
Mayo, R., Schul, Y., & Burnstein, E. (2004). “I am not guilty” vs “I am innocent”: successful 
negation may depend on the schema used for its encoding. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 40(4), 433-449.  
Mazis, M. B., & Adkinson, J. E. (1976). An experimental evaluation of a proposed corrective 
advertising remedy. Journal of Marketing research, 13(2), 178-183.  
Mazis, M. B., McNeill, D. L., & Bernhardt, K. L. (1983). Day-after recall of listerine corrective 
commercials. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 2, 29-37.  
Meyers-Levy, J., & Sternthal, B. (1993). A two-factor explanation of assimilation and contrast 
effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 30(3), 359-368.  
Monga, A. B., & John, D. R. (2008). When does negative brand publicity hurt? The moderating 
influence of analytic versus holistic thinking. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18(4), 
320-332.  
Monin, P., Noorderhaven, N., Vaara, E., & Kroon, D. (2012). Giving sense to and making sense 
of justice in post-merger integration. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1), 256-284.  
Morrin, M. (1999). The impact of brand extensions on parent brand memory structures and 
retrieval processes. Journal of Marketing Research, 517-525.  
Nedungadi, P. (1990). Recall and consumer consideration sets: Influencing choice without 
altering brand evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 17(3), 263-276.  
Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: 
holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological Review, 108(2), 291-310.  
Norenzayan, A., Smith, E. E., Kim, B. J., & Nisbett, R. E. (2002). Cultural preferences for 
formal versus intuitive reasoning. Cognitive Science, 26(5), 653-684.  
Park, C. W., Milberg, S., & Lawson, R. (1991). Evaluation of brand extensions: the role of 
product feature similarity and brand concept consistency. Journal of Consumer Research, 
18(2), 185-193.  
  
 
86 
Press, M., & Arnould, E. J. (2011). How does organizational identification form? A consumer 
behavior perspective. Journal of Consumer Research, 38(4), 650-666.  
Pullig, C., Netemeyer, R. G., & Biswas, A. (2006). Attitude basis, certainty, and challenge 
alignment: A case of negative brand publicity. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
34(4), 528-542.  
Puzakova, M., Kwak, H., & Rocereto, J. F. (2013). When humanizing brands goes wrong: the 
detrimental effect of brand anthropomorphization amid product wrongdoings. Journal of 
Marketing, 77(3), 81-100.  
Reed II, A., Wooten, D. B., & Bolton, L. E. (2002). The temporary construction of consumer 
attitudes. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12(4), 375-388.  
Roehm, M. L., & Tybout, A. M. (2006). When will a brand scandal spill over, and how should 
competitors respond? Journal of Marketing Research, 46(3), 366-373.  
Rouleau, L. (2005). Micro‐Practices of Strategic Sensemaking and Sensegiving: How Middle 
Managers Interpret and Sell Change Every Day. Journal of Management Studies, 42(7), 
1413-1441.  
Sanchez, R. (2004). Conceptual analysis of brand architecture and relationships within product 
categories. The Journal of Brand Management, 11(3), 233-247.  
Simonin, B. L., & Ruth, J. A. (1998). Is a company known by the company it keeps? Assessing 
the spillover effects of brand alliances on consumer brand attitudes. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 35(1), 30-42.  
Sinha, P. N., Inkson, K., & Barker, J. R. (2012). Committed to a failing strategy: Celebrity CEO, 
intermediaries, media and stakeholders in a co-created drama. Organization Studies, 33(2), 
223-245.  
Snow, D. A., Rochford Jr, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment 
processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. American Sociological Review, 
51(4), 464-481.  
Stammerjohan, C., Wood, C. M., Chang, Y., & Thorson, E. (2005). An empirical investigation of 
the interaction between publicity, advertising, and previous brand attitudes and knowledge. 
Journal of Advertising, 34(4), 55-67.  
Swaminathan, V., Reddy, S. K., & Dommer, S. L. (2012). Spillover effects of ingredient branded 
strategies on brand choice: A field study. Marketing Letters, 23(1), 237-251.  
Till, B. D., Baack, D., & Waterman, B. (2011). Strategic brand association maps: developing 
brand insight. Journal of Product & Brand Management, 20(2), 92-100.  
Todorov, A., & Uleman, J. S. (2003). The efficiency of binding spontaneous trait inferences to 
actors’ faces. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(6), 549-562.  
Vaara, E., & Monin, P. (2010). A recursive perspective on discursive legitimation and 
organizational action in mergers and acquisitions. Organization Science, 21(1), 3-22.  
Van Heerde, H., Helsen, K., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2007). The impact of a product-harm crisis on 
marketing effectiveness. Marketing Science, 26(2), 230-245.  
van Vuuren, M. (2012). Merger, She Wrote: Improvising on the Script of Identification Processes 
  
 
87 
During Mergers Advances in Mergers & Acquisitions (39-53), Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, Bingley. 
Votola, N. L., & Unnava, H. R. (2006). Spillover of negative information on brand alliances. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 16(2), 196-202.  
Weick, K. E. (1979). Social psychology of organizing, McGraw-Hill, New York   
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations, Sage, Thousand Oaks 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of 
sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409-421.  
Weilbacher, W. M. (2003). How advertising affects consumers. Journal of Advertising Research, 
43(2), 230-234.  
Williams, R. H., & Benford, R. D. (2000). Two faces of collective action frames: A theoretical 
consideration. Current Perspectives in Social Theory, 20, 127-152.  
Wojciszke, B., Brycz, H., & Borkenau, P. (1993). Effects of information content and evaluative 
extremity on positivity and negativity biases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
64(3), 327-335.  
Woodside, A. G. (2001). Editorial: Sense making in marketing organizations and consumer 
psychology: Theory and practice. Psychology & Marketing, 18(5), 415-421.  
 
 
  
  
 
88 
Appendix 1 Brand Crisis and Firm Response Scenario of Study 1 
 
CCTV News Channel, April 13th: Earlier this year, the FDA released official documents 
casting further suspicion on the safety of Colgate toothpaste. The documents revealed that 
scientific evidence relied on by the FDA to permit one type of Colgate toothpaste came not from 
Colgate, but from a third party institution. In fact, this was not the first suspicious account that 
this toothpaste has ever received. British media once reported that this toothpaste contains 
Triclosan, which can cause cancer. However, Colgate insisted that the FDA had permitted this 
toothpaste, indicting it was safe to use this product. Currently, the release of the documents 
questions the authority and accuracy of the FDA’s safety conclusions. Recent research shows that 
Triclosan can trigger the fibrosis of hepatic cells thereby increasing the probability of liver 
cancer. The FDA plans to conduct a new examination concerning the safety of this type of 
toothpaste based on the recent research. Colgate still believes there is no evidence of harm from 
the toothpaste, though the research used animals, not human beings, as its target. Colgate also 
has no plan to change the formula of the toothpaste.  
Since 2000, functional toothpaste has started to enter the Chinese market. Many companies 
have launched products with functions, such as anti-cavity or brightening. The anti-bacterial 
function of Triclosan widely uses such components in toothpaste products. Aiming at the harm 
that Triclosan can bring to Colgate toothpaste, we interviewed other producers in the toothpaste 
industry. Among the companies we interviewed, the head of the public relations department of 
Darlie emphasized that: “Our products contain no Triclosan, and we won’t use this component in 
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the future.” [The sensehiding response was “We pay attention to this issue. We will make sure of 
the safety of our products by following updated regulations and recent research.”] The safety of 
toothpaste plays a very important role in our daily life. We will continue tracking further 
progress on this issue. 
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Appendix 2 Brand Crisis Scenario of Study 2 
 
Recently, the number of brand crises in the fast food category has risen sharply. Such 
phenomena have attracted our attention. A series of interviews were conducted. One of 
McDonald’s employees told our journalist that the processing of frozen chickens has standard 
requirements. However, these requirements are always violated. A raw frozen chicken is put into 
a bucket of water for only a few seconds. Then, the employee wraps the chicken in flour while 
blood still covers the chicken’s surface. No one bothers to change the water in the bucket even 
though the water is tainted and chicken fat is floating in it. Moreover, the employees do not cook 
the chickens long enough during rush hours. Chicken wings should be fried for seven and a half 
minutes. However, consumers may be served a pair of chicken wings cooked for only five 
minutes. Meanwhile, the expiration dates of the chickens were changed at the employees’ will, as 
they changed the food packaging and wrote new expiration dates on them. Additionally, the 
journalist found one employee who used a package of expired materials to make a chicken 
hamburger. Having doubts, the employee considered the expiration date as the main reason for 
using this package of raw materials. One of the attractions of foreign fast food is its 
standardization. As the industry leader, however, McDonald’s has been exposed to brand-harm 
crises several times. We will continue to pay attention to this issue to avoid further damage 
brought on by McDonald’s. 
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Appendix 3 Brand Crisis Scenario of Study 3 
 
    According to the Beijing News, the leader in the sports shoe industry, Nike, has attracted 
concern due to a “double standard” issue. In advertising its new shoes, Nike emphasized that Air 
Max technology is used in both the forefoot and heal positions. However, a professional report 
provided by a shoe website indicated that there is no Air Max in the forefront position. 
Furthermore, the report pointed out that the product sold aboard does have Air Max in both 
positions. Given this “double standard,” Nike paid monetary fines ordered by the Beijing 
Industry and Commerce Bureau as a penalty for its deception. The amount was close to five 
million Yuan. Nike thereafter issued a corrective announcement, saying that its promotion 
materials caused the misrepresentation. The company also deleted the description of the 
technology and executives issued a recall for the product. However, can the damage that this 
“double standard” brings really be eliminated？Please pay attention to our further reports.  
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Figure 1: Interaction Effect between Response Strategy and Brand Relatedness on 
Compliance Intention (Study 1) 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect between Response Strategy and Brand Relatedness on 
Compliance Intention (Study 2) 
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect between Response Strategy and Brand Relatedness on the 
Change in Brand Evaluation (Study 2) 
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Figure 4: Interaction Effect between Response Strategy and Brand Relatedness on the 
Change in Brand Evaluation (Study 3) 
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Table 1: Mean Values (Standard Deviation) of the Dependent Variable-Compliance 
Intension in Study 1 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving 3.992a (.769) 3.865 (.757) 
Sensehiding 2.887a (1.032) 3.600 (.770) 
Note. Cell mean in the same column with same superscripts are significantly different from each other at 
p<.001 
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Table 2: Mean Values (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – Compliance 
Intention in Study 2 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving 3.564a (1.077) 3.332 (1.106) 
Sensehiding 2.727a (.819) 3.191 (1.128) 
Note. Cell mean in the same column with same superscripts are significantly different from each other at p<.01 
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Table 3: Mean Values (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – Change in Brand 
Evaluation in Study 2 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving .321 (.813) -.090a,b (.855) 
Sensehiding .330 (.891) -.794a (1.104) 
Silence .147(.834) -.662b(.891) 
Note. Cell mean in the same column with same superscripts are significantly different from each other at p<.01 
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Table 4: Mean Values (Standard Divisions) of the Dependent Variable – Change in Brand 
Evaluation in Study 3 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving -.431 (1.076) -.507a,b (.899) 
Sensehiding -.346 (1.196) -1.182 a (.908) 
Silence -.480(1.132) -1.107 b (.909) 
Note. Cell mean in the same column with same superscripts are significantly different from each other at p<.01 
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Table 5: Simple Size of the Dependent Variable-Compliance Intension in Study 1 
 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving 33 39 
Sensehiding 42 35 
 
  
  
 
101 
Table 6: Simple Size of the Dependent Variable- Change in Brand Evaluation in Study 2 
 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
Sensegiving 35 35 
Sensehiding 32 34 
Silence 35 36 
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Table 7: Simple size of the Dependent Variable- Change in Brand Evaluation in Study 3 
 
 Low Brand Relatedness High Brand Relatedness 
  Thinking Style Holistic  Analytic Holistic  Analytic 
Sensegiving 22 18 21 19 
Sensehiding 21 20 21 21 
Silence 20 20 21 19 
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Appendix 1 Measures of Thinking Style in Study 3 
 
Attitude toward Contradiction: 
1. It is more important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right/wrong, 
when one’s opinions conflict with other’s opinions. 
2. When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to compromise and 
embrace everyone’s opinions. 
3. It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.  
4. I found myself use contradictory ways to deal problems.  
5. I found some of my thoughts are contradictory to each other.  
Locus of attention: 
1. It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts. 
2. We should consider the situation a person is faced with, as well as his/her personality, in 
order to understand one’s behavior. 
3. The happen of one thing can cause many other things.  
4. Two ostensibly unrelated things are always related to each other.  
5. When I judge or think about one thing, I am accustomed to put it into its background.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
